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Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and
Judicial Review:
On The Theoretical and Historical Origins of
the Israeli Legislative Override Power
by RIVKA WEILL*
Introduction
It is often asserted that a formal constitution does not demand
judicial review over primary legislation.' Rather, a country may
conceive other mechanisms to protect the constitution from intrusion
by the regular political bodies.2 The question arises whether the
* Assistant Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC). I
thank Bruce Ackerman, Aharon Barak, Avihay Dorfman, David Enoch, Alon Harel,
Assaf Jacob, Arthur Jacobson, Roz Myers, Amnon Reichman, Mike Siedman, Yoram
Shachar and Mark Tushnet for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article.
This article is part of a larger project titled "Sui Generis? The Hybrid Israeli
Constitutional Experience" available on the Social Science Research Network since May
2009. It was presented at an international conference on judicial review held at Hebrew
University Faculty of Law in May 2009. I thank the participants for their comments. It
should be noted that Hebrew sources and citations were translated by the author, unless
noted otherwise.
1. By formal constitution, I mean a constitution that enjoys the following three
characteristics: Identification, supremacy, and entrenchment. Identification means that it
is relatively easy to identify what comprises the constitution. There is a commonly
accepted document that citizens and elites alike refer to as the country's constitution.
Supremacy means that the legal system includes a hierarchy of norms under which the
constitution is treated as supreme over regular law. Thus, a regular statute may not
infringe constitutional provisions. Entrenchment means that the constitutional
amendment process is more arduous than the amendment of regular law. Obviously,
different countries offer a spectrum of these characteristics, and the fulfillment of the
requirements is often a matter of degree rather than of kind. Cf Ruth Gavison, The
Constitutional Revolution: A Reality or a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?, 28 MISHPATIM 21, 34-
37 (1997).
2. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115
YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001); COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
CASES AND MATERIALS 99-113 (Norman Dorsen et al., eds., 2d ed. 2010); Rivka Weill,
Evolution vs. Revolution: Dueling Models of Dualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 429 (2006).
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reverse holds true. Can we envision a country that exercises judicial
review over primary legislation yet lacks a formal constitution? Israel
seems to provide an interesting case study in this regard. Prior to the
famous 1995 United Mizrahi Bank decision,' in which the Israeli
Supreme Court decided to treat Israel's Basic Laws as its formal
Constitution,' Israel's Supreme Court exercised judicial review over
primary legislation without a formal constitution to expound.
It is also regularly contended that American-style judicial review,
under which the courts are empowered to invalidate statutes, is not
compatible with parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary
sovereignty has traditionally been understood to require three
cumulative conditions: (1) that parliament may enact any statute
except one that restricts its successors; (2) that constitutional law is on
par with regular law and may be enacted or amended like any other
statute; and (3) that no judicial review power over primary legislation
is granted to the courts.! Thus, the British Human Rights Act of 1998
formulated the incompatibility framework, under which the superior
courts may issue declarations of incompatibility but not invalidate
statutes, to avoid granting the courts the final say regarding
constitutional matters.6 In fact, since many in Britain believe that
parliamenfary sovereignty is still their fundamental constitutional
principle, this principle is one of the main obstacles to the adoption of
a formal British constitution.! Israel, however, disproves this
convention as well. Prior to 1995, although the Court exercised
American style judicial review, under which it ordered not to apply
statutes, the Israeli constitutional system was one of parliamentary
3. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Collective Vill. 49(4) PD 221
[1995] (Isr.) [hereinafter United Mizrahi Bank]. It was partially translated in 31 ISR. L.
REV. 754, 764 (1997). See also full translation at 1995-2 ISR. L. REPORTS 1, available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/93/210/068/zOl/93068210.zOl.pdf.
4. See Part I below for discussion of the nature of Basic Laws.
5. See ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 39 (8th ed. 1915). However, there has been some relaxation of these
requirements in the twentieth century. See, e.g., Anthony Bradley, "The Sovereignty of
Parliament-Form or Substance?," in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 25, 25-58 (J. Jowell
& D. Oliver eds., 6th ed. 2007).
6. Bradley, supra note 5. See also Gardbaum, supra note 2. The superior courts that
are empowered to issue declarations of incompatibility are enumerated in section 4 of the
Human Rights Act, 1998.
7. In fact, in the U.K. Parliament's official site, parliamentary sovereignty is
described as "the most important part of the UK constitution." See Parliamentary
sovereignty, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/sovereignty/ (last
visited on Sept. 15, 2011).
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sovereignty, under which constitutional law was handled on par with
regular law, as elaborated below."
This article contributes to a better understanding of Israel's
constitutional system, as well as its implications for comparative
constitutional law. In the Israeli context, this article will first focus on
the period preceding the United Mizrahi Bank decision. Part I will
establish that Israel's constitutional system during the founding era
(1948-1992/5) was based on parliamentary sovereignty.' To do so, it
will discuss the understanding of the relevant political actors of
Israel's Parliament (the Knesset), and its constitutional powers prior
to United Mizrahi Bank. It will analyze how both the Knesset and
Israel's Supreme Court treated the enactment of Basic Laws during
that era. The article will argue that both bodies viewed Basic Laws as
being on par with regular laws, a perspective that is compatible with
parliamentary sovereignty.
Part II will attempt to explain the Court's exercise of American-
style judicial review against the backdrop of the tradition of
parliamentary sovereignty during the founding era. It will analyze the
renowned Bergman decision, given in 1969, in which the Court, for
the first time in Israel's constitutional history, exercised its judicial
review in refusing to apply a statute.o It will offer six different
interpretations of Bergman, which served as the prevailing precedent
for the exercise of judicial review before United Mizrahi Bank. I
contend that all six interpretations suggest that the Court's actions,
although atypical of parliamentary sovereignty systems historically,
may align with parliamentary sovereignty.
Part III will suggest a new understanding of how the Knesset's
compliance with the Court's exercise of judicial review did not
amount to a legislature's acquiescence that a formal constitution
existed in Israel during the founding era. While the widespread
scholarly understanding" shared by the Justices in United Mizrahi
8. See Parts I to III below.
9. The founding era stretched from 1948, when the Israeli State was founded, until
1992, when the Knesset enacted the Basic Laws dealing with individual rights, or even
until 1995, when United Mizrahi Bank was decided. If 1992 is the defining closing date,
then it was mainly the Knesset that brought about the change in the constitutional regime.
If 1995 is the defining closing date, then the Court, no less than the Knesset, played a
dominant role in bringing about the change in the constitutional regime.
10. HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Fin, and State Comptroller 23(1) PD 693 [1969]
(Isr.) [hereinafter Bergman] (an English translation is available in 4 ISR. L. REv. 559
(1969)).
11. See, e.g., Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Case for the Legislative Override, 10
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 250, 259 n.40 (2005); Gal Dor, Governmental
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Bankl2 is that the Knesset agreed to judicial review even before the
1990s, this article suggests that the Knesset actually circumvented
judicial review prior to United Mizrahi Bank. The Knesset responded
by retroactively revalidating statutes previously ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Part IV explains how United Mizrahi Bank has changed the law
since its occurrence, thus showing the decision's significance. The
article analyzes how United Mizrahi Bank revolutionized Israel's
constitutional law, dividing Israel's constitutional history into
"before" and "after" phases. United Mizrahi Bank is considered one
of the most famous comparative constitutional decisions ever given
by a national supreme court," yet many Israeli scholars discount its
importance.14 This article presents its significance in light of the law
that existed before the decision, thus exposing the extraordinary role
a supreme court may play in the formation of a formal constitution."
This is atypical. Usually, elected bodies serve as leaders of
constitutional change and claim a mandate from the People to bring
Avoidance Versus Judicial Review: A Comparative Perspective on Israeli Decision-Making
Strategies in Response to Constitutional Adjudication, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 231
(1999); Hans. Klinghoffer, Legislative Reaction to Judicial Decisions in Public Law, 18 ISR.
L. REV. 30 (1983); Melville B. Nimmer, The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel's Quest for a
Constitution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1217, 1233 (1970). Cf Claude Klein, Semantics and the
Rule of Law, 9 MISHPATIM 79 (1978) (criticizing the Ressler decision); 1 AMNON
RUBINSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 377-379 (4th ed.
1991) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (4th ed.)] (criticizing the retroactive
technique of the Knesset for its moral inadequacy but finding it constitutionally effective
and valid).
12. See e.g., United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 285, 288, 292-93, 325 (Shamgar,
President); 353, 383 (Barak, President); 468-69 (Zamir, J.); 513-14 (Cheshin, J.).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF
JUDGES (2003); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); DORSEN ET AL., supra note
2, at 103-13; Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 1763 (2004); R.A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 362-68 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Joshua Segev, Who Needs a Constitution? In Defense of the Non-
Decision Constitution-Making Tactic in Israel, 70 ALB. L. REV. 409 (2007); Yoseph .M.
Edrey, Constitutional Revolution?, 3 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 453 (1996). Yoram Shachar
frequently asserts this claim in scholarly discussions because he does not believe that there
have been any substantial consequences to Israel's constitutional revolution. (I refer to
Shachar's view with his consent.)
15. For academic voices suggesting that the Court invented a formal constitution in
United Mizrahi Bank, see, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 362-68; Gavison, supra note 1, at
28-33, 110, 123, 132; Martin Edelman, The Status of the Israeli Constitution at the Present
Time, 21 SHOFAR 1 (2003).
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about change while unelected political bodies, such as courts, serve as
resistant branches, trying to preserve the constitutional status quo. 6
Though Israel has been omitted from the international literature
on the Commonwealth model of constitutionalism, I contend that
post-United Mizrahi Bank, Israel enjoys a hybrid formal constitution
protected by judicial review that fits this new model." Furthermore,
in contrast to the founding experience, the political branches now
either redraft statutes to substantively align with courts' instructions
regarding their constitutionality or overwhelmingly comply with
judicial decisions that invalidate statutes.
To explain this momentous United Mizrahi Bank decision, I
finally offer in Part V four different theories of legitimacy that
comport with the backdrop of Israel's constitutional development.
These theories attempt to legitimize the Israeli Supreme Court's
extraordinary role in the formation of the Israeli Constitution.
Part VI brings the article to a close with a discussion of the
implications of this case study on comparative constitutional law.
Using Israel as a case study, this article offers three important lessons
for comparative constitutionalism: Firstly, it elaborates on the
mechanisms available within a parliamentary sovereignty tradition to
introduce judicial review. These mechanisms include legislative self-
entrenchment; the ultra-vires doctrine; the protection of core
democratic values; and the application of a "manner and form"
approach.
Secondly, Israel's experience also reveals that the
"notwithstanding" mechanism, which enables the regular legislature
to override the constitution (or the court's interpretation of it) for a
16. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Rivka Weill, Evolution vs.
Revolution: Dueling Models of Dualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 429 (2006).
17. Gardbaum, supra note 2; MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS:
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2008); Janet L. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?, 69
MOD. L. REV. 7 (2006); Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model
of Constitutionalism, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 167 (2010). These writers include Canada,
Britain, New Zealand, and lately even Australia within the Commonwealth model. But
see GIDEON SAPIR, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN ISRAEL (2010) (Hebrew), which
discusses the commonwealth model in the Israeli context as a model for future Israeli
development. While Gardbaum, Hiebert and Tushnet focused on Canada, New Zealand
and the United Kingdom, Sapir applies their work in the Israeli context. In his book,
Sapir offers three possible models-a constitution as a gag rule, a constitution as a
dialogue and a constitution as protecting basic values-for Israel's future development.
These models are distinguished based on the reason for constitutional formation.
defined period,'8 is not a Canadian invention, as it is treated by
leading Canadian constitutional scholars.19 Rather, this mechanism
has deep roots in parliamentary sovereignty systems and is a natural
development of common-law interpretation techniques, under which
there is a presumption against implied repeal of fundamental rights.20
This presumption is overcome if the legislature uses explicit override
language.
Lastly, the article suggests that a court might exercise American-
style judicial review over primary legislation, in the sense of not
applying statutes, even within a system of parliamentary sovereignty,
if-as in Israel-both the Court and the legislature minimize the
significance of judicial review. In the case of pre-United Mizrahi
Bank Israel, the Court veiled the constitutional meaning of its actions,
dismissing the use of judicial review as something not to be
considered revolutionary. Similarly, by upholding the Court's
decisions rather than competing with the latter for hegemony, the
Israeli legislature has been able to trivialize the use of judicial review,
casting it as formalistic with little effect. This is a unique
phenomenon in the comparative constitutional world. In other
systems, it is clear that the Court cannot fully make use of judicial
review while remaining in the context of parliamentary sovereignty.
Comparing Israel's founding experience with both its post-United
Mizrahi Bank period and Canadian experience reveals that the
drafting of the constitutional arrangements is no more important than
their actual operation by the various political players. Specifically,
the way both the legislature and the court interpret and utilize
"notwithstanding" clauses may either strip constitutionalism of its
ability to protect core values and rights, or strengthen it. In light of
Israel's and Canada's experiences, I explain how not to interpret
override clauses if one desires robust constitutionalism.
18. See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS 215-21 (2010). However, the legislature should not be authorized to
retroactively revalidate statutes struck down by the court, as further elaborated in Parts
III-VI below.
19. 2 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 174 (5th ed. 2007)
("The power of override seems to be a uniquely Canadian invention, which makes judicial
review suspensory only.").
20. Karen Petroski, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 487 (2004); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982).
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I. The Political Actors' Grasp of Parliamentary Sovereignty
To explain how Israel's Supreme Court employed judicial review
against the backdrop of the Knesset's sovereignty, it is first necessary
to establish the fact that Israel's constitutional system was based on
parliamentary sovereignty during the founding era. In this Part, I
argue that the treatment of the Basic Laws by the Knesset and the
Court prior to United Mizrahi Bank demonstrates that Israel's "rule
of recognition" at the founding era was that of parliamentary
sovereignty.2 1
A. The Status of Basic Laws
1. Why Were Basic Laws Enacted in Israel?
The young Zionist State was founded in 1948 on the remnants of
its immediate predecessor, the British Mandate. To avoid legal
chaos, the new State adopted (by statute) the law that existed at the
time of the State's founding, but with the alterations required due to
its establishment. The adopted law included British judicial decisions
that served as precedents for the new State.22 Not only did British law
influence the new legal system through official adoption, but Mapai,
the political party which led the Israeli government almost exclusively
from 1948 to 1977, and its leader David Ben-Gurion, were also strong
advocates of the British legal tradition of parliamentary sovereignty."
As Israel was based on a parliamentary rather than presidential
system, the government enjoyed the confidence of a majority of seats
in the Knesset.2 4 Thus, both elected branches-the government and
21. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-10 (2d ed. 1994) (writing that the
ultimate rule of recognition is identified by the practice of courts, officials and private
persons of the legal system).
22. Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, OG No. 2 p. 1, § 11 (Isr.). See
Daniel Friedmann, Infusion of the Common Law into the Legal System of Israel, 10 ISR. L.
REV. 324 (1975); Aharon Barak, The Israeli Legal System-Tradition and Culture, 40
HAPRAKLIT 197, 202-05 (1992).
23. See 1 AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL 26 (5th ed. 1996) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIOANL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th
ed.)]. See also Shlomo Aronson, David Ben-Gurion and the British Constitutional Model,
3 ISR. STUD. 193 (1998); Michael Mandel, Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in
Israel, 33 ISR. L. REV. 259, 266-67 (1999).
24. The elections to the Knesset also determine the identity of the government. The
President (fulfilling mainly a symbolic role) assigns the task of establishing a government
to a Knesset Member that enjoys the support of a majority in the Knesset. See Basic Law:
The Government, 5761, SH No. 1780 p. 158, § 7 (Isr.). Since the government needs the
confidence of the Knesset to rule, it is composed of representatives of political parties that
enjoy a majority of MKs. Id. at § 3. Though Basic Law: The Government was replaced
the Knesset-venerated the British legal tradition and looked to it for
guidance throughout Israel's founding era. In addition, during its first
years, the British legal system, more than any other, influenced the
new Israeli courts' jurisprudence. The judges often cited British cases
as inspiration and to back their decisions.25 The latter was not
surprising, as many of the judges were educated in the British
tradition.26 This way all three branches of government used the
British model of parliamentary sovereignty as a model to imitate
during the founding period.
How does the enactment of the Basic Laws fit in with this British
influence? Prima facie, they do not easily fit with British legal
influence as they demarcate constitutional law from regular law, in
contradistinction to one of parliamentary sovereignty's major
premises.2 Basic Laws' origins may be found in United Nations
General Assembly's Resolution 181, dated November 29, 1947, which
prescribed the adoption of a democratic constitution by the Jewish
State.' The Israeli Declaration of Independence of May 14, 1948,
envisioned a constitution, in accordance with this U.N. Resolution,
yet Israel has legislated and enacted only regular and Basic Laws.2 9
twice since its first adoption, these arrangements portray the law as it existed during the
founding period.
25. In 1956, the primacy of British references reached a peak with 40% of references
in Israeli Supreme Court decisions being of British origin. This percentage declined
gradually and consistently, with no particular identifiable reason according to Y. Shachar,
R. Harris & M. Gross, Citation Practices of the Supreme Court, Quantitative Analyses, 27
MISHPATIM 119, 152,157-59 (1996).
26. Of the Supreme Court Justices serving in the years 1948-1980, 20% were
educated in England, 20% were educated in Israel and 32% were educated in Germany.
See ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN, JUDGES OF THE LAND 142 (1980). For the ramifications of
these demographics, see Fania Oz-Salzberger & Eli Salzberger, The Secret German
Sources of the Israeli Supreme Court, 3 ISR. STUD. 159, 185 (1998) (arguing that Israel's
"German" Supreme Court judges were "Anglophilians").
27. For parliamentary sovereignty's major premises, see DICEY, supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
28. See Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestinian Question, G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947),
available at http://www.prospectsforpeace.com/Resources/UNIUNGAR181.pdf. This
resolution prescribed said steps for both the Jewish and Arab states in preparation for
their independence after the British mandate ended in Israel.
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Basic Laws have been enacted in Israel as part of a compromise,
known as the Harari Resolution, passed by the First Knesset.
The First Knesset was elected with the primary role of enacting a
constitution. Its election campaigns focused on the various proposals
for a constitution advocated by the political parties." Despite this,
even during the election, it became clear that the Knesset would also
function as a regular legislative assembly. 2 Due to the latter, the
legislative and constitutive tasks were merged into the role of one
body, consistent with the European constituent assembly model, but
deviating from the American model of separate assemblies for each
task.33 Originally, the Israeli Declaration of Independence envisioned
the American model," but the outbreak of the War of Independence
postponed the election of the Constituent Assembly from November
25, 1948, to January 25, 1949." Moetzet Ha'am (the Provisional State
Assembly), which issued the Declaration of Independence and served
as a temporary legislative assembly, refused to extend its legislative
role without a direct appeal to the people." Therefore the assembly
was dissolved allowing the new Constituent Assembly to perform
both legislative and constitutive functions.37
Contrary to expectations, the First Knesset could not agree on
whether or not it wanted to adopt a constitution. Prime Minister
David Ben-Gurion and the governing Mapai party believed that the
British model of parliamentary sovereignty was preferable, whereas
30. Knesset Resolution from the 13th of June, DK (1950) 1743 (Isr.).
31. Nimmer, supra note 11, at 1239, n.92; Yechiam Weitz, General Elections and
Governmental Crises, 9 ISRAEL AT THE FIRST DECADE 10 (2001). "Only in this election
was the constitutional issue brought to the voter decision as a matter of legal
requirement." United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 486 (Cheshin, J.).
32. Moetzet Ha'am (the Provisional State Assembly) enacted the Transition to a
Constituent Assembly Ordinance, on January 13, 1949, stating that it would dissolve after
the Constituent Assembly is elected and assembled.
33. See Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 191 (1995) (discussing different models of constitution-making).
34. The Declaration contemplated that Moetzet Ha'am will serve as Israel's interim
Parliament until elected and regular governmental bodies were created according to a
formal constitution. See 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.), supra note 23, at
50-51.
35. Weitz, supra note 31, at 10-12.
36. See Uri Yadin, The Transition to a Constituent Assembly Act, in 1 IN MEMORIAM
URI YADIN 79, 79-82 (Aharon Barak & Tana Spanic eds., 1990) (speech on January 17,
1949). Moetzet Ha'am included representatives of both the Jewish population in Israel
and the Zionist movement.
37. The Transition to a Constituent Assembly Ordinance, 5709-1949, OG No. 42 p.
105, §§ 1 and 3 (Isr.).
right-wing minority leader, Member of Knesset (MK) Menachem
Begin, supported the American model of a supreme constitution.
Ben-Gurion believed that the young state had a different starting
point than the American founding. It had no federal structure and
was not established as a rejection of the British model. Israel most
needed not a supreme constitution unalterable by regular means and
protected by judicial review as in the United States, but rather a
strong basis for the rule of law, meaning the rule of every statute, and
for democracy in the sense of majority rule. Ben-Gurion argued that
a supreme constitution would undermine citizens' confidence in both
the rule of law and the role of the judiciary. The latter's position was
not surprising considering the political hegemony Mapai enjoyed.
Mapai saw no reason to relinquish its control of national legislation
by adopting a constitution.
Ben-Gurion also argued that it was too early for Israel to adopt a
Constitution, when most of its expected population was still living in
the Diaspora. He also thought that Israel just had its constitutional
moment in the form of the Declaration of Independence that enjoyed
unanimous support from the Jewish political parties and population
and the State was not ready for yet another constitutional moment. 9
Furthermore, many members of the Orthodox Jewish political parties
believed that Israel did not need a formal constitution, since Jewish
religious law was or, more accurately, should be seen as its
constitution. Some MKs also worried about the results of adopting a
constitution while under emergency rule.40
Instead, the First Knesset adopted the Harrari Resolution.
According to the Resolution, the task of proposing a constitution was
entrusted to a Knesset committee that would draft chapters of the
constitution that the Knesset would enact as Basic Laws. When the
task was complete, all Basic Laws would be unified in one document
to serve as Israel's Constitution.
As expected of a compromise, everyone understood this
resolution differently. The status of the Basic Laws enacted prior to
38. See DK (1950) 812-820 (Isr.).
39. Id. at 820.
40. Benyamin Neuberger, The Constitution Debate in Israel, in GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS IN ISRAEL unit 3, 25-37 (1990); Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a
Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 309 (1995); Ran Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial
Empowerment Through Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, 36 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 73 (2000); Barak Cohen, Empowering Constitutionalism with Text from an Israeli
Perspective, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 585 (2003).
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the completion of the constitution was unclear: During the interim
period would these laws be treated as regular laws or as superior to
them? How would the constitution be consolidated-by a special
enactment process or technically? Could other bodies propose Basic
Laws-as in fact happened with most Basic Laws -or only the
committee? Who would determine when the constitution was
complete; did the First Knesset contemplate a deadline? These
ambiguities were intentionally left for future Knessets to address,
since the First Knesset failed even to reach a consensus on the most
fundamental question: Whether a constitution was at all desired.42
The First Knesset did not enact any Basic Laws. Later Knessets
enacted a total of twelve Basic Laws, ten dealing with the structure of
government and division of power between the different branches
and only two, enacted in 1992, dealing with individual rights.43 In fact,
the Justices in United Mizrahi Bank, decided in 1995, regarded the
enactment of the two individual rights Basic Laws-Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation-as a "constitutional revolution,"" as it was the first time
in Israel's history that Basic Laws dealt exclusively with individual
rights. For the first time in Israel, Basic Laws were also substantively
entrenched (i.e., a limitations clause). By substantive entrenchment, I
mean that the laws themselves set substantive criteria that any
infringing statutes would have to fulfill. The 1992 Basic Laws require
41. 2 AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL 731 (6th ed. 2005) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (6th
ed.)].
42. Neuberger, supra note 40, at 38-40.
43. Before 1992, the following Basic Laws were enacted: Basic Law: The Knesset,
5718, SH No. 244 p. 69 (Isr.); Basic Law: Israel Lands, 5720, SH No. 312 p. 56 (Isr.); Basic
Law: The President of the State, 5724, SH No. 428 p. 118 (Isr.); Basic Law: The
Government, 5728, SH No. 540 p. 226 (Isr.); Basic Law: The State Economy, 5738, SH No.
777 p. 207 (Isr,); Basic Law: The Army, 5736, SH No. 806 p. 154 (Isr.); Basic Law:
Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, 5740, SH No. 980 p. 186 (Isr.); Basic Law: The Judiciary,
5744, SH No. 110 p. 78 (Isr.); Basic Law: The State Comptroller, 5748, SH No. 1237 p. 30
(Isr.). The Knesset completely replaced Basic Law: The Government twice. For the
history of enactment, see 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.), supra note 23, at
687-730; 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (6th ed.), supra note 41, at 821-79. In
1992, the Knesset enacted the two Basic Laws dealing with individual rights as further
elaborated in the text. In April 2009, the Knesset enacted and then amended, in 2010,
Basic Law: The State's Budget for the Years 2009 and 2012 (Special Provisions)
(Provisional Enactment), 2009.
44. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 352-55 (Barak, President). Barak, more
than any other speaker, is identified with coining the term "constitutional revolution" to
describe the enactment of the 1992 Basic Laws. Aharon Barak, The Constitutional
Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 9, 9-13 (1992).
that any statute that infringes upon their provisions must pass the
following cumulative four-part substantive test: (1) the conflicting
provision must be in a statute or authorized by a statute; (2) the
infringement must be compatible with the values of a Jewish and
democratic State; (3) it must be done for a proper purpose; and (4) it
must be proportional.45 Until then, Basic Laws sometimes included
provisions dealing with procedural, but not substantive,
entrenchment. That is, they set a special amendment process, usually
requiring the consent of a specified supermajority of MKs to amend
them.4
2. Did the Knesset Treat the Basic Laws as Constitutional in Nature?
The Knesset did not differentiate between the enactments of
regular and Basic Laws; rather, both were enacted via the same
legislative process of three readings.47 In the Knesset, members often
spoke of the Knesset as sovereign and entitled to enact any law. Even
when enacting Basic Laws, members emphasized that the Knesset
was enacting them as an exercise of its sovereignty.48 Sometimes,
during the enactment process, MKs would also highlight the
importance of Basic Laws for their constitutional content, and as an
implementation of the Harrari Resolution. 49  Employing the same
legislative process for regular laws and Basic Laws is characteristic of
parliamentary sovereignty systems.
45. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752, SH No. 1391 p. 150, § 8 (Isr.); Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754, SH No. 1454 p. 90, § 4 (Isr.) (Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation originally enacted in 1992, replaced in 1994).
46. Basic Law: The Knesset, §§ 4 and 45; Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, §
7; Basic Law: The State Economy, § 3b(c).
47. The legislative process consists of three readings for each bill. The first reading is
the one in which the statute is introduced to the Knesset and a vote takes place on
whether to refer the bill to the committee stage. The second reading takes place after the
bill emerges from the committee stage, and during this reading, a vote takes place on each
section separately to allow a vote on objections to particular provisions. The last reading
is on the bill as a whole as the content has been defined in the second reading. If it is a bill
that has been proposed by a private MK, there is an additional preliminary vote to the
three regular readings. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (6th ed.), supra note 41, at
733-43.
48. See, e.g., United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 496-501 (Cheshin, J., citing MKs'
speeches). In fact, in the first five editions of the classic book on Israel's constitutional
law, the Knesset was portrayed as sovereign. The fifth edition was published in 1996 after
the Israeli constitutional revolution, but nonetheless chapter 11 was entitled "the
sovereignty of the Knesset and its limits." CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.),
supra note 23, at 409.
49. On the Harrari Resolution, see supra notes 30 and 41 and 42 and accompanying
text.
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Even the number of MKs participating in the enactment of Basic
Laws was no higher than that typical of regular enactments. Basic
Laws often passed with the presence of only a few MKs.' In fact, the
two revolutionary Basic Laws regarding individual rights were
enacted in 1992 with only a minority of MKs present. Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation passed its first reading with a vote of twenty-
one to sixteen, and the final reading passed with the support of
twenty-three MKs and none against. Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty passed its first reading with the vote of forty to twelve, and
the final reading with the support of thirty-two MKs and twenty-one
against. Many MKs, including coalition members, preferred to spend
their time campaigning for the upcoming election rather than
participating in the Basic Laws' enactment." In fact, these 1992 Basic
Laws were enacted in March 1992, three months before general
elections were held, during what some considered a legislative lame
duck period, with accompanying legitimacy problems characteristic of
such transition of power. For most Basic Laws, there is not even an
official record of the number of MKs supporting their enactment;
only six of the twelve Basic Laws even have partial data of the MKs'
vote." The Knesset simply did not treat Basic Laws differently than
regular laws.
50. Cf Barak Medina, Four Myths of Judicial Review: A Response to Richard
Posner's Critique of Aharon Barak's Judicial Activism, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 1, 2
(2007), available at: http://www.harvardilj.org/2007/08/online_49_medinal (asserting that
"the bulk of the Basic Laws passed by a decisive majority.").
51. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.), supra note 23, at 918.
52. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT (1999); John Copeland
Nagle, The Lame Ducks of Marbury, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 317 (2003); Jack M.
Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions, 84
N.C. L. REV. 1253 (2006); Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L.
REV. 947 (2003); Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557 (2003); Rivka Weill,
Constitutional Transitions: The Role of Lame Ducks and Caretakers, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1736
088.
53. There is no record on MKs' votes on Basic Law: Israel Lands, 5720, SH No. 312 p.
56 (Isr.); Basic Law: The President of the State, 5724, SH No. 428 p. 118 (Isr.); Basic Law:
The Government, 5728, SH No. 540 p. 226 (Isr.), except for the vote on first reading of
fifty-one to twenty-three MKs (DK (1966) 2533 (Isr.)); Basic Law: The State Economy,
5735, SH No 777 p 206 (Isr.); Basic Law: The Army, 5736, SH No. 806 p. 154 (Isr.); Basic
Law: The Judiciary, 5744, SH No. 110 p. 78 (Isr.); and Basic Law: The State Comptroller,
5748, SH No. 1237 p. 30 (Isr.).
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It has, however, been suggested that in 1994 the Knesset replaced
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation with a new one, this time with the
presence and support of sixty-seven to nine MKs on third reading. 14
With this replacement, the Knesset also amended some sections of
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Thus, the broader support of
MKs in 1994 remedied the slim support granted to these Basic Laws
in 1992."
While tempting, there are numerous difficulties with this
assertion. In 1994, the Knesset replaced Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation on the advice of the Supreme Court that such a move was
advisable if it wanted to guarantee that a statute prohibiting the
importation of nonkosher meat would survive constitutional
scrutiny." In the 1994 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, the
Knesset adopted an override clause to the effect that the Knesset
could enact, with the support of an absolute majority of MKs (61 out
of 120), an infringing statute explicitly proclaiming its validity despite
its conflict with the Basic Law. This override would be valid for four
years, unless a shorter period was provided for in the infringing
statute." The government, headed by Prime Minister Rabin, had to
replace the Basic Law if it wanted to retain the ultraorthodox political
party, Shas, in the coalition.
Thus, the 1994 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation passed
hastily, within less than a month." Some MKs wrongly assumed that
they were voting for the statute prohibiting the importation of non-
kosher meat rather than for the Basic Law.6 Many of the most
important provisions in the Basic Law were not included in the
original draft and appeared only in the second and third readings,
with MKs unaware of their change of content.6 ' Both Prime Minister
54. See DK (1994) 5439 (Isr.).
55. See Dan Meridor, Court Rulings in light of the Basic Laws, in CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM IN ISRAEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS-CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 1994
69, 70-71 (1995). See also 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.), supra note 23, at
915.
56. HCJ 3872/93 Meatrael Ltd v. Prime Minister and Minister of Religions 47(5) PD
485, 505 [1993] (Isr.). The decision was given on October 22, 1993.
57. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754, SH No. 1454 p. 90, § 8 (Isr.).
58. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.), supra note 23, at 922-23.
59. The government publicized the draft of the Basic Law on February 14, and the
Basic Law had become law already on March 10, 1994. See Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 5754, SH No. 1454 p. 90 (Isr.).
60. See Ariel Bendor, Defects in the Enactment of Basic Laws, 2 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL
443, 445-46 (1994) [hereinafter Bendor, Defects].
61. Id. at 445-47.
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Rabin and Shas later "discovered" that the Basic Law they had voted
for included reference to the Declaration of Independence and felt
"cheated." They had learned, after their vote, of the Basic Law's
declaration that the rights enumerated in it and in Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty would be respected in the spirit of the principles
embodied in the Declaration of Independence. 62 This Shas and Rabin
never intended to enact or so they claimed. Because of the reference
to the Declaration of Independence in the amended Basic Law, Shas
never returned to the coalition despite the fact that the Basic Law was
amended only to enable its return.63 This history of enactment does
not easily support the "redemption" story that has been ascribed to
the 1994 enactment. The majority of MKs enacting the 1994 Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation does not attest to broad, deep and
decisive support for the Basic Laws.
In addition, the Knesset placed Basic Laws that were supposedly
of constitutional nature on the same level as regular statutes. Thus,
the Knesset amended Basic Laws using regular statutes as well.
Furthermore, the Knesset did not treat the Basic Laws with the
respect usually accorded to a formal constitution. It frequently
amended Basic Laws to suit new political conditions, as exemplified
by the prohibition on importing nonkosher meat.64  Placing
constitutional statutes on par with regular statutes is one of the main
characteristics of parliamentary sovereignty in the Diceyan tradition.
The main differences between Basic Laws and regular statutes as
far as their enactment was concerned were the following: First, the
title "Basic Law," as opposed to simply "Law," and the absence of a
year mark separated the former from regular legislation, placing them
in a category of their own; second, Basic Laws usually dealt with
constitutional as opposed to regular issues, although some regular
statutes addressed constitutional matters," and some Basic Laws
contained quotidian concerns.
62. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754, SH No. 1454 p. 90, § 1 (Isr.) and the
amended new § 1 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752, SH No. 1391 p. 150
(Isr.).
63. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.), supra note 23, at 924.
64. See, e.g., Bendor, Defects, supra note 60.
65. See DICEY, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
66. Two notable examples are The Woman's Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, SH No. 82
p 248 (Isr.) and The Law of Return, 5710-1950, SH No. 51 p. 159 (Isr.).
67. See 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.), supra note 23, at 375-77.
3. How Did the Court Perceive the Basic Laws?
The Court often ruled on cases based on the assumption that the
Knesset was the sovereign." Wherever possible, it would interpret
statutes in conformity with basic individual rights. The Court would
infer in every statute a general objective purpose to protect individual
rights and promote the basic values of the legal system, in addition to
its specific subjective legislative purpose. Nevertheless, when such an
interpretation was not possible, the statute would prevail over
individual rights that were simply considered judge-made common-
law rights. For example, in the early years of the State's founding,
Jewish couples who wished to be wed in a civil ceremony, rather than
according to Jewish law, claimed that the 1953 statute imposing
Jewish religious law on every marriage and divorce of Jewish Israeli
citizens and inhabitants infringed upon their freedom of religion-or
more precisely, their right to be free from religion.6 9 They were
denied a remedy. The Court unequivocally ruled that individual
rights, even if embodied in the Declaration of Independence, could
not prevail over explicit conflicting statutes."
However, this did not prevent the judges from interpreting
statutes creatively and contrary to legislative intent in an attempt to
respect individual rights during the founding era. In this regard,
prior to the United Mizrahi Bank decision, Israel at least had an
interpretive constitution. That is, it had a common-law constitution
with interpretive force when construing statutes.72 In addition, the
Court required the executive branch to respect individual rights and
not infringe upon them by secondary legislation or executive acts,
unless it had an explicit statutory authorization to do so.? This kind
68. See, e.g., CA 228/63 Azuz v. Ezer 17(4) PD 2541, 2547 [1963] (Isr.) (Berenzon, J.)
("There is no doubt that according to Israel's constitutional law, the Knesset is sovereign
and may enact any statute it desires."); HCJ 112/77 Fogel v. Broad. Auth. 31(3) PD 657,
664 [1977] (Isr.) (Landau, Deputy President) ("This is how we earned a quasi-judicial Bill
of Rights . . . that is subordinate to the sovereign will of the Knesset as a legislative
assembly.").
69. Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, SH
No. 134 p. 165 (Isr.).
70. CA 450/70 Rogozinski v. Israel 26(1) PD 129 [1971] (Isr.).
71. 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (6th ed.), supra note 41, at 68.
72. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 728 (using the expression "interpretive" bill of rights
with respect to New Zealand).
73. See, e.g., HCJ 262/62 Peretz v. Local Municipality Kfar Shemaryahu 16 PD 2101
[1962] (Isr.); HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transp. 37(3) PD 337 [1983] (Isr.).
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of a constitution may align with the traditional theory of legislative
sovereignty. 74
Also, like the Knesset, the Court did not treat Basic Laws as
supreme. It allowed the Knesset to amend Basic Laws using regular
statutes,75 applying the general maxims of interpretation onto Basic
Laws, so that a subsequent regular statute could repeal an earlier
Basic Law.7 ' Besides, an earlier regular statute which was specific in
nature would prevail over a later general Basic Law." Thus, there
was no formal constitution seen as supreme over regular enactments,
but rather all legislation enjoyed similar status as part of a system
based on the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty.
B. Legislative Self-Entrenchment Power
Against this background of parliamentary sovereignty, both the
Knesset and the Court treated the Knesset as enjoying self-
entrenchment power-that is, the power to entrench its enactments
against repeal by a simple random majority of MKs present. The
Knesset utilized this power when enacting statutes that included
procedural or substantive entrenchment provisions. While
procedural entrenchment made the amendment process more
arduous, substantive entrenchment set substantive criteria that
infringing statutes must fulfill. The Knesset primarily exercised this
entrenchment power to protect against the random amendment of the
Basic Laws' provisions. Still, few Basic Laws were eventually
entrenched. In fact, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty lacks
procedural entrenchment, although it contains substantive
entrenchment. Its proponents had tried to include a provision
requiring an absolute majority of MKs (61 out of 120) for its
amendment, but the proposal was one vote short of majority
support.8 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, on the other hand,
74. For recent British debates regarding the compatibility of purposive interpretation
and parliamentary sovereignty, see J. W. F. ALLISON, THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL
CONSTITUTION: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EFFECTS 186-236 (2007).
75. See, e.g., HCJ 148/73 Kniel v. Minister of Justice 27(1) PD 794, 795 [1973] (Isr.)
[hereinafter Kniel]; HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of the Elections to the Knesset
Cent.Comm'n 31(2) PD 556 [1977] (Isr.) [hereinafter Ressler].
76. Kniel, supra note 75; Ressler, supra note 75.
77. Lex specialis derogat generali. CrimA 107/73 Negev v. Israel 28(1) PD 640, 642
[1974] (Isr.) (Berenzon, J.).
78. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL (5th ed.), supra note 23, at 921-22 & n.40.
does enjoy procedural entrenchment demanding the support of an
absolute majority of MKs to amend it.79
Entrenchment provisions are not unique to Basic Laws and can
be found in regular enactments as well. The Knesset used
entrenchment in statutes dealing with economic matters when it
wanted to indicate to the public its commitment to a certain economic
policy.' It also attempted to entrench some of its statutes regarding
the territory of the Israeli State and its borders."
Procedural entrenchment provisions usually did not exceed the
requirement that a statute be amended by the support of an absolute
majority of MKs.' One may even argue that such a requirement is
disconnected from entrenchment, but merely a demand that MKs be
present when enacting certain policies, i.e., a form of quorum
79. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754, SH No. 1454 p. 90, § 7 (Isr.).
80. The Protection of the Israeli Public Investment in Financial Assets Act, 5744-
1984, SH No. 1121 p. 178, § 3 (Isr.), requires an absolute majority of MKs for its
amendment to signal to the public that the government would not unilaterally alter the
conditions of financial instruments such as state bonds. Until 1995, there was also a
procedural entrenchment provision in section 45b of The Bank of Israel Act, 5714-1954,
SH No. 164 p. 192 (Isr.) (inserted by amendment 15 enacted in 1985, SH No. 1156 pp.201-
203), requiring an absolute majority of MKs to amend section 45a. The entrenchment
aimed at restricting the government's authority to borrow money from the Central Bank,
thus increasing the amount of money available in the market.
81. For example, Jerusalem's territory may not be relinquished but by amendment of
Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, which requires the support of an absolute
majority of MKs. Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, 5740, SH No. 980 p. 186, § 7
(Isr.).
A government's decision to relinquish territory that is officially part of Israel's territory is
subject to Knesset's authorization by an absolute majority vote. The Law and
Administration (Relinquishment of the Applicability of Law, Jurisdiction and
Administration) Act, 5759-1999, SH No. 1703 p. 86, § 2 (Isr.). This section however is not
itself entrenched and may thus be amended by regular majority vote. HCJ 1169/07 Rabes
v. Israel's Knesset (unpublished, 2007), available at: http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/
07/690/011/BO2/07011690.b02.pdf. Recently, the Knesset enacted The Law and
Administration (Relinquishment of the Applicability of Law, Jurisdiction and
Administration) (Amendment) Act, 5771-2010, SH No. 2263 p. 58 (Isr.), in which it
requires to hold a referendum before the elected bodies decide to relinquish territory that
is annexed to Israel. It is mainly relevant with regard to East Jerusalem and the Golan
Heights, since Judea and Samaria were never officially annexed. If at least eighty MKs
support the relinquishment of territory, then the requirement to hold a referendum may
be ignored.
82. This is true of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754, SH No. 1454 p. 90, § 7
(Isr.) (entrenching the entire Basic Law); Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, 5740,
SH No. 980 p. 186, § 7 (Isr.); Basic Law: The Government, 5761, SH No. 1780 p. 158, § 44
(Isr.) (entrenching the entire Basic Law); Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718, SH No. 244 p. 69,
§ 4 (Isr.); Basic Law: State Economy, 5738, SH No. 777 p. 207, § 3b(c) (Isr,).
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requirement.F Usually, in the absence of entrenchment provisions,
the Knesset has no quorum requirements and a statute may be
enacted with even the smallest presence of MKs."4 Although an
absolute majority requirement was the most prevalent procedural
entrenchment form, exceptions may be found, including
entrenchment provisions requiring the consent of two-thirds of MKs
(80 of 120)."
Surprisingly, when the Knesset exercised its entrenchment
power, it often enacted entrenchment provisions with simple random
majority rather than the support of the supermajority required to
overcome the entrenchment." Thus, a small majority could have
seized power to entrench policies that did not enjoy the support of
even an absolute majority at the time of their enactment, let alone
later on.
Prior to the enactment of the 1992 Basic Laws, substantive
entrenchment existed only in a few regular statutes.& Usually,
substantive entrenchment required an explicit amendment (or
override) of the provision at stake. 9 In other words, substantive
entrenchment (merely) reversed the regular interpretation maxim
that a later statute may impliedly repeal an earlier statute."
83. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 535-42 (Cheshin, J.).
84. Basic Law: The Knesset, § 25.
85. Thus, for example, Basic Law: The Knesset, § 45 states: "Section 44, or this
section, shall not be varied save by a majority of eighty members of the Knesset."
86. Thus, for example, Basic Law: The Government, enacted in 1992, in § 56, required
the support of an absolute majority of MKs for its amendment. This Basic Law, however,
was enacted by a vote of fifty-five to thirty-two MKs in the last reading. DK (1992) 3862-
63 (Isr.). Similarly, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation passed in 1992 the third reading by
a vote of twenty-three to zero MKs. DK (1992) 3392-93 (Isr.). However, section 5
included an entrenchment provision requiring an absolute majority of MKs for its
amendment. Moreover, even the enactment of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation of
1994 did not enjoy the requisite absolute majority support required for its amendment
since many of the most important provisions within it did not appear on first reading.
87. On the legitimacy difficulties of asymmetric entrenchment, see John 0. McGinnis
& Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative
Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003).
88. The Woman's Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, SH No. 82 p. 248, § la (Isr.); The
Budget Principles Law, 5745-1985, SH No. 1139 p. 60, § 3a (Isr.); Commodities and
Services Control Law, 5718-1957, SH No. 240 p. 24, § 46(b) (Isr.).
89. See, e.g., HCJ 104/87 Nevo v. Nat'l Labor Ct. 44(4) PD 749, 764 [1990] (Isr.), HCJ
256/88 Medinvest Herzliya Med. Ctr. v. CEO of Minister of Health 44(1) PD 19, 42-46
[1989] (Isr.), HCJ 1438/98 Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religions 53(5) PD 337,
385-88 [1999] (Isr.) (Cheshin, J.), HCJ 4124/00 Yekutieli v. Minister of Religious Affairs
(Jun. 14, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
90. For the rationale of this maxim, see Petroski, supra note 20.
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To conclude, the enactment process of the Basic Laws reflected a
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty under which there is no
substantive distinction between the treatment of regular and
constitutional law. The Court, too, saw the division between regular
and Basic Laws as "mere semantics."91
II. How Does Judicial Review Fit with Parliamentary
Sovereignty?
What was the force behind the entrenchment provisions? Did
the Court enforce the entrenchment provisions against a
noncompliant Knesset attempting to amend an entrenched provision
without the necessary majority required?
Prior to United Mizrahi Bank, only four times did the Court
enforce an entrenchment provision against a noncompliant Knesset.9
On all four occasions, the provision was section 4 of Basic Law: The
Knesset, which defines the nature of the electoral system in Israel, as
follows:
The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal,
secret and proportional elections, in accordance with the
Knesset Election Law. This section shall not be varied save by
a majority of Members of Knesset.93
On all four occasions, the Knesset attempted to infringe upon the
norm of "equal elections," found at the core of any fair elections in a
democratic society. This norm protects both the right to equal vote
(every eligible citizen has one vote) and the right to equal access to
power (every eligible citizen may be elected), unless an absolute
majority of MKs agreed to the retraction. Each time, the Court
demanded that the Knesset either amend the infringing law in a way
that would respect equal elections norms or reenact the infringement
with the necessary support of an absolute majority of MKs. Until one
of the latter conditions was upheld, the Court ordered the elected
branches not to apply the infringing statute.
91. Ressler, supra note 75, at 560.
92. Bergman, supra note 10; HCJ 246/81 Agudat Derech Eretz v. Broad. Auth. 35(4)
PD 1 [1981] (Isr.) [hereinafter Agudat Derech Eretz]; HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein MK v.
Chairman of the Knesset 37(3) PD 141 [1983] (Isr.) [hereinafter Rubinstein]; HCJ 172,
142/89 Laor Movement v. Chairman of the Knesset 44(3) PD 529 [1990] (Isr.) [hereinafter
Laor Movement].
93. See Basic Law: The Knesset-1958, THE KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.ili
laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
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A. Theorizing Bergman
The first decision on this topic was given in 1969, in the
groundbreaking Bergman case. In United Mizrahi Bank, Justice
Zamir treated Bergman as a precedent for the existence of judicial
review power over primary legislation, thereby anchoring the timing
of the "constitutional revolution" with the Bergman, rather than the
United Mizrahi Bank, decision.94 Is this handling of the Bergman
decision justified?
Dr. Bergman was a Tel-Aviv attorney. He appealed to the
Israeli Supreme Court, serving as the High Court of Justice, arguing
against the validity of a 1969 finance law that granted public funding
for the (then) upcoming general elections.95 He claimed, inter alia,
that the finance law treated the political parties competing at election
unequally, because it provided public funding only to political parties
already represented in the outgoing Knesset, thus discriminating
against newly founded political parties. As such, the finance statute
violated the "equal elections" norm guaranteed by section 4 of Basic
Law: The Knesset without enjoying the support of a "majority" of
MKs during its enactment." Bergman sought and won an injunction
to prevent the execution of the finance law.
The Bergman decision is six pages long, standing in sharp
contrast to the length of the United Mizrahi Bank decision. The
opinion of the Court is laconic and veils more than it reveals.
Although the Court ordered the legislature to either reenact the
finance law in a way that aligns with equal elections norms or reenact
the infringement with the necessary majority, it did not explain why,
if at all, it had the power of judicial review over primary legislation.
The (then) Attorney General, Meir Shamgar, later the President of
the Court when United Mizrahi Bank was decided, was so convinced
of his victory that he did not bother to argue against the Court's
judicial review authority. Instead, Shamgar requested that the Court
allow him the opportunity to argue against such authority if it became
94. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 468.
95. Elections to the Knesset and Local Authorities in the Year 5729 (Financing,
Limitation of Expenses and Auditing) Law, 5729-1969, SH No. 5729 p. 48 (Isr.)
[hereinafter Finance Act].
96. The stated Finance Act, supra note 95, passed first reading by a majority of
twenty-four to two. The Knesset's records of third reading merely state that the law was
"adopted," without recording the count of the votes. The Petitioner argued that this
session too was not attended by a majority of MKs, and the Attorney General did not
dispute that. Bergman, supra note 10, at 696.
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relevant.97 His request was de facto denied, without justification,
probably due to the pressing need to reach a decision before the
upcoming election.98 Later, the Bergman decision would serve as
precedent for the Court's judicial review power. But what theory
should be attributed to it? How could this decision be generalized
and serve as future precedent? Based on Bergman's precedent, when,
if at all, was judicial review over primary legislation justified?
At least six different theories may be offered to explain the
Court's decision in Bergman, each of which suggests a different scope
of the Court's judicial review power.
1. Basic Law Counts: Constituent Authority Theory
The first is that all "Basic Laws" were supreme and should be
treated as part of Israel's formal constitution. This interpretation
treats the Knesset as enjoying constituent powers in addition to its
legislative powers, and these constituent powers are exercised when
enacting "Basic Laws" alone. Thus, any regular statute, such as the
finance law mentioned above, that infringes upon Basic Laws'
provisions, must pass a constitutional "limitations test," which the
finance law failed to do as it conflicted with the Basic Law and lacked
majority support.99 This theory allows a constitutional future to Israel
since it ascribes to Israel's legislature continuing constituent powers,
exercised by the use of the title "Basic Law" at enactment stage,
without necessitating a break with the past and a new beginning.
While this theory may have been plausible at the time of the
Bergman decision, it did not align with later Court decisions during
this era. Later decisions did not treat Basic Laws as supreme, as
elaborated in Part I. Thus, this is not the best available theory to
explain the Bergman decision.'0o
97. Bergman, supra note 10, at 696.
98. Bergman petitioned the Court on April 30, 1969, and the decision was given on
July 3 that year. Bergman, supra note 10. The elections were held on October 28, 1969.
See also Peter Elman, Case Comment, 4 ISR. L. REV. 565, 566 (1969); Claude Klein, Case
Comment, 4 ISR. L. REV. 569, 572 (1969).
99. See Claude Klein, A New Era in Israel's Constitutional Law, 6 ISR. L. REV. 376
(1971); C. Klein, The Constituent Power in Israel, 2 MISHPATIM 51, 55 (1970).
100. "Best" in the Dworkian sense; see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
For support, see also Amos Shapira, Judicial Review Without a Constitution: The Israeli
Paradox, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 405, 416 (1983).
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2. Entrenchment Counts: A Sovereign Power that Restricts Itself
A second possible theory is one that emphasizes the importance
of entrenchment and not "Basic Laws." In other words, when a later
statute conflicts with an entrenched provision of an earlier statute,
whether the entrenchment appears in a Basic Law or in a regular
statute, the entrenched provision prevails. Thus, the conflicting
statute must fulfill the requirements of the entrenchment to survive
judicial scrutiny. Since the finance law at stake in Bergman violated
equal elections norms without the majority support required by the
entrenched provision of section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, it failed
scrutiny. This entrenchment theory lines up with the remedy the
Court proposed in Bergman: To reenact the finance act with the
support of the necessary majority.' It also enjoys theoretical support
from H.L.A. Hart, who argued that two concepts of sovereignty were
possible: The first was that of a sovereign that could not restrict itself;
the other was a sovereign that could restrict itself, but once restricted,
was no longer sovereign with respect to the issue entrenched."
Recognizing the Knesset's power to entrench means Israel chose the
second concept of sovereignty in the Hartian sense. Furthermore, the
fact that the Court imposes entrenchment on bridging Knessets seems
to suggest not only that the Knesset enjoys entrenchment powers, but
that the powers are actually effective."
It should be noted, that it is not clear whether the finance law
mentioned in Bergman conflicted with section 4 of Basic Law: The
Knesset in the following manner: The wording of section 4 seems to
suggest that only amendment, not infringement, of section 4 would
require the support of an absolute majority. The finance law in no
way attempted to redefine equal elections norms, but rather infringed
upon it in a specific election. The Bergman Court was not aware of
the distinction between infringement and amendment existing in
constitutional jurisprudence, as it was not explicit in Israel's
constitutional jurisprudence until United Mizrahi Bank,M and thus
101. On the legislative self-entrenchment power, see, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002); John C.
Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773 (2003); McGinnis & Rappaport,
supra note 87.
102. HART, supra note 21, at 149.
103. Cf DICEY, supra note 5, at 21 ("That Parliaments have more than once intended
and endeavoured to pass Acts which should tie the hands of their successors is certain, but
the endeavour has always ended in failure.").
104. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 274-76 (Shamgar, President).
applied section 4 to the case at hand. In fact, the legislature was made
aware of this distinction only by Barak, the then Deputy Chief
Justice, in his letter to the Chairman of the Constitution, Legislation
and Justice Committee of the Knesset on January 11, 1994,
responding to the Knesset's draft of Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation of 1994, which replaced the 1992 version. 5 Nonetheless,
ever since the Bergman decision, section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset
has been interpreted in a way that a majority is required for both
amendment and infringement. In other words, "amendment"
includes infringement regarding section 4 alone." This is a
manifestation of how sporadic the Israeli constitutional development
has been.
The entrenchment theory assumes that what counts is solely
entrenchment, not the constitutional status of the enactment that
includes the entrenchment.'07  However, the question remains
whether the Israeli Supreme Court would have reached the same
result in Bergman were this an entrenchment in a regular statute, as
opposed to a "Basic Law." Although the Knesset has entrenched
both "Basic Laws" and regular statutes, there is no legal case yet
dealing with an infringement of procedural entrenchment provisions
in regular statutes. The Court did apply substantive entrenchment
provisions in regular statutes by requiring that a later statute
infringing upon them do so explicitly, rather than implicitly.108 The
theory of entrenchment, therefore, may explain the Bergman
decision.
3. Combination of Entrenchment and Basic Law
A third plausible theory is that only entrenched "Basic Laws"
prevail over later conflicting regular statutes. In other words, the
combination of a "Basic Law" and an entrenchment provision is
105. For Barak's letter, see Aharon Barak, On the Amendments to "Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation," 2 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 545 (1994) [hereinafter Barak,
Amendments].
106. See supra note 92, enumerating three later cases in which the court interpreted the
section in this way. Barak now supports reinterpreting section 4 of Basic Law: The
Knesset so that absolute majority will be needed only for amending the Basic Law and
infringement will be handled by a judicially imposed limitations clause similar to the one
at place with regard to the 1992 Basic Laws dealing with individual rights. See supra note
45 with regard to the limitations clause. See also BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY, supra note
18, at 182-87.
107. See Ariel Bendor, Entrenchment and Constitution: Bergman and the Constitutional
Discourse in Israel, 31 MISHPATIM 821 (2001).
108. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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necessary to overcome the democratic maxim that later statutes
prevail over earlier ones." This interpretation restricts the
effectiveness of legislative self-entrenchment to constitutional matters
only, to prevent undue burden on the legislature's sovereign powers.
In other words, the advantage of such a theory, in addition to
enabling the adoption of a formal constitution by the legislature
without a revolution and a new beginning (like the first theory
discussed above), is that it puts inherent limits to the Knesset's
entrenchment powers. Supposedly, the Knesset's entrenchment
powers are recognized only in the context of constitutional matters.
In fact, prior to United Mizrahi Bank, the Court de facto applied
the Bergman precedent in only three cases, all of which dealt with the
protection of section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset."o Thus, the
Bergman decision applied de facto only to Basic Laws that were
entrenched. In addition, one may find support for such a proposition
in judicial decisions."' Even Justice Aharon Barak, as late as 1990, in
Laor Movement, emphasized that "there is normative supremacy to
an entrenched Basic Law""2 and "this entrenchment is valid in our
system, because we recognize the Knesset's authority to act as a
Constituent Authority."H3  Nowhere in this decision does Barak
suggest that even Basic Laws, which are not entrenched, are supreme.
4. Ultra Vires Doctrine
A fourth theory that may be presented as an explanation of the
Bergman decision is that of self-dealing or usurpation of power.
According to this theory, the Court treated the finance act at stake in
Bergman as the product of self-dealing on the part of MKs. By
preventing public funding for new political parties, members of the
legislature were effectively trying to limit their electoral competition
109. See David Kretzmer, The Path to Judicial Review in Human Rights Cases: From
Bergman and Kol Ha'am to Mizrahi Bank, 28 MISHPATIM 359 (1997).
110. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. The later judicial decisions'
understanding of the precedential nature of the case is important in determining its
contribution. See RUPERT CROSS & J. W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 45-47
(4th ed. 1991).
111. See also HCJ 306/81 Plato Sharon v. Knesset Comm. 35(4) PD 118, 135-36 [1981]
(Isr.) (Landau, President) (writing that judicial review is possible only in the context of
entrenched statutory provisions, or even entrenched Basic Laws).
112. Laor Movement, supra note 92, at 539.
113. Laor Movement, supra note 92, at 539.
and entrench themselves in office.11 4  The Court thus treated the
finance act as the usurpation of the Knesset's legislative powers and
beyond its authority to legislate. Although the Knesset enjoys
legislative powers, those are granted by the people at election. The
people, however, never granted MKs the power to entrench
themselves in office."' Understood as such, the power of judicial
review is limited to cases of gross usurpation of power, much like the
famous British seventeenth century Dr. Bonham's Case.'16 In fact, as
already mentioned, in all subsequent cases in which the Court
exercised the power of judicial review over primary legislation, it was
always in the case of section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset and always
involved self-dealing by MKs."'7  This theory of self-dealing may be
described as a strand of common-law constitutionalism theory, under
which courts impose the most fundamental values of the legal system
on the legislature, even without a formal constitution to expound."'
The difficulty with the theory arises, however, on the remedial
front. In all cases dealing with the infringement of section 4 of Basic
Law: The Knesset, the Court granted the Knesset the option to either
remove the violation of self-dealing or reenact the violation with the
support of an absolute majority of MKs. If the Court treated self-
114. See also HCJ 7111/95 Union of Local Authorities in Isr. v. Knesset 50(3) PD 485,
509 [1996] (Isr.) (Cheshin, J.) (writing that in all four cases-Bergman, Agudat Derech
Eretz, Rubinstein and Laor Movement-the Knesset's legislation amounted to self-
dealing).
115. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE, § 141
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). See also J.W. GOUGH,
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 180-86 (1955). During
both World Wars, however, the British Parliament extended its life to meet the
emergency.
116. Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P.); 8 Co. Rep. 114a. See also
Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30
(1926); Edward S. Corwin, The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928); Raoul Berger, Doctor Bonham's Case: Statutory
Construction or Constitutional Theory?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1969).
117. Cf Yoav Dotan, The Knesset as 'Legislating for Itself in the Jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court, 31 MISHPATIM 771 (2001) (arguing that because the Court relied on
section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, this could not have been the theory underlying the
Court's decision).
118. See T. R. S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE
RULE OF LAW (2001); Paul Craig, Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and
Supremacy, 2003 PUB. L. 92; David Jenkins, Common Law Declarations of
Unconstitutionality, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L. 183 (2009).
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dealing as a usurpation of legislative power, it is not clear why the
support of an absolute majority of MKs would remedy this conflict.'
19
5. Ely's Democratic Enhancement Process Theory
A fifth possible theory is that nothing was decided in the case.
Retired President Landau, who wrote the Bergman decision, used
similar words to describe the ratio of the case in articles published in
both 1971 and 1996.120 The 1996 article was written by Landau as a
response to the United Mizrahi Bank decision. He was upset with
both Shamgar and Zamir for using his opinion in Bergman as a
precedent for the United Mizrahi Bank decision. Landau felt that
Bergman could not serve as precedent for either the assertion that
Israel has a formal constitution in the form of "Basic Laws" or that
the Court has the power of judicial review over primary legislation.
He read his own Bergman decision to mean that "all the
constitutional questions were left open."1 21
While Landau's proposition seems peculiar in light of the remedy
granted in the Bergman case, the decision does lack an explanation
for the Court's judicial review authority. If a precedent is judged by
its reasoning rather than its outcome, no theory that may be relied
upon in future cases was offered in Bergman.122
It may be further suggested that because of the distinctiveness of
the issue at stake-i.e., ensuring equal elections to the legislative
assembly-no one has ever challenged the Court's judicial review
authority to protect the very foundation of a democratic society. This
is in keeping with J. H. Ely's theory, suggesting that the court is
justified in exercising judicial review only to enhance the democratic
process.12 1 In other words, while the Bergman case was pending, the
urgency of coming to a decision at election time meant that the
119. It is interesting to compare this remedy to the corporate context. When
confronted with directors' or controlling shareholders' self-dealing, many times the
remedy is to require approval from a panel of noninterested constituents.
120. Moshe Landau, The Supreme Court as Constitution Maker for Israel, 3 MISHPAT
UMIMSHAL 697, 699-700 (1996) [hereinafter Landau, Constitution Maker]. See also
Moshe Landau, The Constitution as a Supreme Law of the State?, 27 HAPRAKLIT 30, 30
(1971) (writing that "the Supreme Court refrained from answering these [constitutional]
questions").
121. Landau, Constitution Maker, supra note 120, at 700.
122. See CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 110, at 47-48 (regarding how to determine the
ratio where the reasoning is lacking from the decision).
123. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980). Ely was highly influenced by United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
Attorney General was never granted his request to argue against the
Court's judicial review authority. In later cases, the Attorney
General probably felt that, in such a fundamental matter as ensuring
equality in impending elections, she would not want to insist on
questioning or undermining the Court's judicial review authority.
Rather, the overriding concern was to remedy any statute that might
infringe upon the equality of elections.124 With no one to challenge
the Court's judicial review authority, the Bergman decision became a
precedent for the Israeli Court's power of judicial review over
primary legislation.
In this sense, even if the Bergman decision was revolutionary, the
scope of the revolution was limited to ensuring equal elections. The
Court enjoyed judicial review power only in the context of enhancing
democratic processes where the regular mechanisms of checks and
balances failed to achieve equality in the political realm. Obviously,
this is no small matter. Equal elections norms are part of the very
essence of a democratic society. Despite this, prior to United Mizrahi
Bank, Israel was still very far from a fully formed constitution.125
6. Manner and Form Requirements
A sixth plausible theory is that the Bergman decision enforced a
quorum requirement on MKs. As discussed above, Israeli law usually
enforces no attendance requirements on MKs in order to enact laws.
Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset necessitated such attendance by
demanding the support of a "majority" of MKs to amend it. The
Court enforced such a "quorum" or "attendance" requirement
because it aligned with democratic theory. Section 4 did not require
the support of more than the majority to amend a statute if all
members were attending and participating in the debate. But the
Bergman decision should not be understood as precedent for the
validity of any entrenchment provision that exceeds the requirement
of an absolute majority of MKs. Such an entrenchment provision
124. See, e.g., Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 6 (stating that the Attorney
General decided not to raise challenges to the Court's judicial review authority because he
seeks the Court's opinion on the merits whether there was any infringement on equal
elections norm).
125. In fact, Justice Grunis, in a dissenting opinion after United Mizrahi Bank was
decided, expressed support for the exercise of judicial review in the limited context of
Ely's theory. See HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov't v. Knesset 61(1) PD 619, 798-
810 [2006] (Isr.). For support of Ely's theory in Israeli academic circles, see e.g., Moshe
Cohen-Eliya, Towards a Procedural Limitation Clause, 10 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 521
(2007).
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would not be in line with basic democratic principles of majority
rule. 126 This is, in fact, how Justice Cheshin interpreted the Bergman
decision in his United Mizrahi Bank dissent. Cheshin recognized the
validity of procedural entrenchment provisions as long as they did not
require the support of more than a majority of MKs. He viewed such
entrenchment provisions as essentially "quorum," "attendance" or
"manner and form" requirements which were valid whether they
appeared in regular statutes or Basic Laws. 127
The "manner and form" approach tries to distinguish itself from
legislative self-entrenchment in the sense that only procedural, and
not substantive, restrictions on future legislation are possible.
Further, any restriction should be subject to majority rule and thus
not amount to true entrenchment. In addition, the procedural
restriction is compatible with parliamentary sovereignty because it is
perceived to be within parliament's domain to define how it enacts
law. As long as parliament acts according to the predefined
procedure, it may also amend the legislative process. 28 Judicial
review that results from the "manner and form" theory is also
distinguished from judicial review of internal proceedings of the
legislature. This is so, since "manner and form" applies only when
the predefined legislative process is codified in a statute, not internal
rules of the legislative bodies.
B. Compatibility with Parliamentary Sovereignty
Are these six different theories (offered above to explain the
Bergman decision) compatible with parliamentary sovereignty? The
first three theories enable judicial review in the context of imposing
on a sovereign legislature its own self-imposed restrictions. Thus, if
what counts is the title "Basic Laws"(first theory), then the Knesset
uses this title to indicate its desire to entrench the enactment at stake.
If what counts is entrenchment per se (second theory), then the
126. See, e.g., Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 101; Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-
Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
185 (1986) (contending that entrenchment is constitutional only if done by a hierarchical
authority).
127. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 535-47.
128. See, e.g., Sir W. IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 139-145
(3rd ed. 1943); R. F. V. HEUSTON, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-31 (2d ed. 1964);
Hamish R. Gray, The Sovereignty of Parliament Today, 10 U. TORONTO L.J. 54 (1953); R.
Elliot, Rethinking Manner and Form: From Parliamentary Sovereignty to Constitutional
Values, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 215 (1991); M.H. Tse, The Canadian Bill of Rights as an
Effective Manner and Form Device: An Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision
in Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General), 18 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 71 (2005).
Knesset's authority is unlimited, unless it imposes limits upon itself in
the form of entrenchment. If what matters is the combination of the
title "Basic Law" and an entrenchment provision (third theory), then
the Knesset uses such combinations, and only such combinations, to
limit itself. Under all three theories, if judicial review becomes
effective, then the unlimited sovereign body becomes restricted. Its
sovereignty is ultimately curtailed. These theories may align with
parliamentary sovereignty only in the second Hartian sense, not the
traditional Diceyan way.
The last three theories enable judicial review without truly
restricting majority rule of the legislature. The underlying
commitment of these theories is to hold democracy as a fundamental,
common-law constitutional value that is protected by the courts as a
last resort. Thus, if only in cases of gross usurpation of legislative
power does the Court intervene (fourth theory), then even in
seventeenth century Britain there is precedent for the exercise of
judicial review power to protect against conflict of interests. Even in
a parliamentary sovereignty system, the regular mandate granted by
the people at election does not include the power of the legislature to
entrench itself in office. If "nothing" was decided in the case (fifth
theory), then it is due to the Knesset's consent, rather than by the
Court's verdict, that equal elections norms have prevailed even
against subsequent conflicting statutes. Further, such an approach
aligns with Ely's democratic theory that judicial review power is
justified only as an enhancement of democratic mechanisms. Only
then is judicial review democratic, not counter-majoritarian. If it is
only a quorum requirement that the Court is enforcing (sixth theory),
then entrenchment provisions are not truly entrenchment but rather
absolute majority requirements. According to such theory, the
Knesset is not only sovereign but also unlimited. These last three
theories thus better align with traditional parliamentary sovereignty
concepts in the Diceyan sense. Under all six theories, Israel's
particular legislative and judicial history prior to United Mizrahi Bank
suggests the coexistence of judicial review and parliamentary
sovereignty.
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H. The Knesset's Response: Trivializing Judicial Review
A. How Did the Knesset Respond to the Exercise of Judicial Review?
1. The Bergman Decision and the Validity Act of 1969
Following Bergman, the Knesset upheld the Court's decision. It
complied with both remedies suggested by the Court, although they
were offered alternatively rather than cumulatively. In other words,
it would have been sufficient for the Knesset to adhere to one of the
remedies proposed.
Under the amended finance law, enacted twelve days after the
Bergman decision, established political parties already represented in
the outgoing Knesset received the bulk of their financing ahead of the
election, while the new competing political parties were granted
funding retroactively and only if successful at the polls. Also, under
the new finance statute, existing parties were granted funding
according to their percentage of seats in the outgoing Knesset while
new parties were granted funding according to their percentage of
MKs in the incoming legislature. 129 While established political parties
still enjoyed some advantage at election by receiving the money
upfront, MKs believed that the amended finance law conformed to
the Bergman Court's suggestion that the law fulfill the requirements
of "substantive," rather than "formal," equality norms at elections.30
This amended finance law passed with the support of at least sixty-
one MKs in all three readings as required under section 4 of Basic
Law: The Knesset.131
Prima facie, this response of the Knesset grants great respect to
the Court's judicial review power and attempts to comply with the
substantive requirements of equality set forth in section 4 of Basic
Law: The Knesset. This would have been an accurate portrayal of the
129. See Elections to the Knesset and the Local Authorities in the Year of 5729
(Funding, Expenditure Limits and Auditing) (Amendment), SH No. 5729 p. 201 (Isr.)
(passed on July 15, 1969). The Bergman decision was given on July 3, 1969.
130. Bergman, supra note 10, at 700. Some Opposition MKs believed all political
parties should have been granted funding according to their percentage of seats in the new
Knesset to minimize the inequality between existing and new political parties, but their
position was rejected. See DK (1969) 3581-3583 (Isr.).
131. It passed first reading with the support of eighty MKs, five against and two
abstaining. DK (1969) 3592 (Isr.). It passed second reading with the support of no less
than sixty-seven MKs with regard to each of the sections of the bill. It passed third
reading with the support of seventy-six MKs, six against and two abstaining. DK (1969)
3678-79 (Isr.). Interestingly, MK Uri Avneri complained that MKs were absent during the
discussions and appeared for the actual vote alone. Id. at 3580.
Knesset's reaction, but for the Knesset's subsequent and very bold
actions. The Knesset-to avoid risking another challenge to the
(now) amended finance act-enacted a unique statute entitled
"Elections (Certification of the Validity of Statutes) Act of 1969"
(hereinafter the "Validity Act").'32 This Act certified retroactively
and through reference that all existing enumerated statutes dealing
with the upcoming elections were valid. With the retroactive
validation, MK Shmuel Tamir argued that the Knesset was "trying to
revive the dead."' The Knesset enacted this Validity Act by an
absolute majority of MKs to guarantee that it conformed to the
majority requirements of section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.134
What was peculiar about the Knesset's move was not only that it
was done retroactively, but that the Validity Act itself, rather than the
potential infringing election statutes, was passed by the required
absolute majority. Furthermore, the statute did not even identify all
statutes that may enjoy its protection, using a general language that it
applies to "every other provision of law dealing with elections to the
Knesset or election propaganda to the Knesset as they are phrased at
the time this statute becomes effective.""' The Chair of the
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset, MK Moshe
Unah, explained that the law should cover even future law that "may
be enacted tomorrow in the Knesset." 6
132. Elections (Certification of the Validity of Statutes) Act, 5729-1969, SH No. 568 p.
204 (Isr.). See also DK (1969) 3679-83 (Isr.). It stated:
"1(a) To remove doubt, it is hereby provided that the provisions included in
election laws for the Knesset are valid for all law and intents and purposes
from the day of their enactment.
(b) In this section, "election laws for the Knesset" mean Elections to the
Knesset Statute [combined version], 1969; Elections (Propaganda Ways),
1959; Elections to the Knesset and the Local Authorities in the Year of 5729
(Funding, Expenditure Limits and Auditing), 1969; and every other
provision of law dealing with elections to the Knesset or election
propaganda to the Knesset as they are phrased at the time this statute
becomes effective."
133. DK (1969) 3680 (Isr.).
134. It passed first reading with a majority of seventy-nine MKs, six against and one
abstaining. DK (1969) 3592 (Isr.). It passed second reading with a majority of seventy
MKs, eight against and five abstaining. It passed third reading with a majority of sixty-
eight MKs, eight against and five abstaining. DK (1969) 3683 (Isr.). Uri Avneri
complained that MKs were not present at discussion but came to vote alone also with
regard to this statute. Id. at 3681.
135. See supra note 132.
136. DK (1969) 3679 (Isr.). MK Uri Avneri criticized this technique for "revalidating"
not only what was already done illegally (and even not identifying the acts for MKs to
know) but with regard to future illegalities as well. Id. at 3681.
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This is a technique of overriding ("to remove any doubt as to the
validity of the enactment") a provision in a Basic Law in a regular
statute, yet the override language does not even include any specific
reference to the constitutional norm infringed. Neither does it give
any accountability regarding how the constitutional norm was
infringed, if at all. With this Validity Statute, the Knesset sought to
grant "immunity" to election statutes from judicial review, as was
explicitly stated at the time the bill was introduced.17 The Court has
accepted this override technique as valid and effective in both Agudat
Derech Eretz'38 and Ressler,'39 stating that the Validity Act's purpose
was clear-"to prevent litigation as to the validity of election laws"
and thus this Validity Act "cures any defect" that might have fallen in
the election laws.'O Interestingly, Dorit Beinish, Israel's current
President of the Israeli Supreme Court, defended the validity of the
Validity Act as representative of the State Attorney in the Ressler
case.
Professor Benjamin Akzin wrote of this ratification technique:
[A]ll I can say is that with all my sympathy for politicians who,
angry at a referee who steps in to point out a 'foul,' decree that
from now on their ball-games should proceed without a referee,
this is not a particularly elevating spectacle. That the referee
himself has suggested such a possibility does not make it more
palatable.141
Furthermore, retroactive revalidation of statutes would become
the prevalent method of the Knesset to deal with the exercise of
judicial review by the Court during the founding era. The Knesset
would exploit this method in three out of the four cases, in which the
Court exercised judicial review. The Knesset would also use the
combination of reference and retroactive validation with general
semi-"notwithstanding" language that makes no specific reference to
the constitutional norm that has been infringed to deal not only with
137. Draft Bill Elections (Certification of the Validity of Statutes), 1969, HH 322 (Isr.).
138. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 16.
139. Ressler, supra note 75, at 559-60. In Ressler, Petitioners challenged inter alia the
validity of the Validity Act, arguing it should have amended section 4 of Basic Law: The
Knesset via a Basic Law and not a regular law. The Court rejected this argument stating
that the difference between a regular statute and a Basic Law was "semantic" alone.
Ressler, supra note 75, at 560.
140. Ressler, supra note 75, at 559.
141. Benjamin Akzin, Judical Review of Statute, 4 ISR. L. REV. 559, 576, 578 (1969).
the Bergman decision but also the Laor Movement decision discussed
below.'42
2. 1981 Elections Campaign: Agudat Derech Erez Decision
Retroactive revalidation of a statute struck down was evidenced
in Agudat Derech Eretz as well.143 Under existing election laws, valid
in 1981, each political party participating in the elections was entitled
to twenty-five minutes of propaganda on the radio and ten minutes
on television ("general party time"). The political parties that were
represented in the outgoing Knesset deserved an additional four
minutes in the radio and four minutes on television for each MK that
served in the outgoing Knesset ("individual time"). This statutory
arrangement was valid, according to the Court, because it was
protected by the Validity Act enacted in 1969.14
The Knesset decided to amend election laws, believing that the
existing arrangement gave undue advantage to a small political party
comprising of one MK in comparison to the number of minutes an
individual MK received, if she were a member of a large political
party.145 It thus adopted in 1981 amendment 6 to Election Law
(Propaganda Ways) under which two minutes would be reduced from
the general party time allocated to all political parties on the radio
and television while two additional minutes on both the radio and
television would be added to each political party for each MK that sat
in the outgoing Knesset.
Agudat Derech Erez, who intended to participate at elections as
a new political party (not represented in the outgoing Knesset),
petitioned the Court against this amendment. The petition asserted
that the amendment violated equality norm, set in section 4 of Basic
Law: The Knesset, by granting undue advantage to existing parties
when compared to new political parties.
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners on May 29, 1981, by
granting an injunction that prevents the execution of the law, unless it
was passed with the required majority of sixty-one MKs in accordance
with section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. The Court did not supply
reasons for its decision, leaving the reasoning to be issued at a later
142. See infra Part III.A.3.
143. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92. See also Klinghoffer, supra note 11, at 33-34.
144. See, e.g., Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 16 (Barak, J.).
145. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 5 (Landau, President, citing the
explanation to the bill).
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time.' The reasoning was finally handed down two months later, on
July 28, 1981.147
In the interim, between the grant of the injunction and the grant
of reasoning, the Knesset enacted amendment 7 to the Election Law
(Propaganda Ways) during its recess and in a special session.148 The
statute was passed in a single day in all three readings.149 Amendment
7 reenacted Amendment 6 with regard to increase of individual
propaganda time but omitted that part of the amendment that
intended to decrease general propaganda time for all parties.
Amendment 7 received retroactive validity from April 9, 1981,
instead of June 15, 1981, the time it was truly enacted.'
One could argue that the Court's decision had real bite. The
Court required the change of propaganda time to be enacted by the
support of at least sixty-one MKs and this was in fact done by the
Knesset. The Knesset supposedly did so openly and deliberately,
paying the public political price in terms of accountability. In
addition, one could argue that the Knesset did not reduce the general
propaganda time for all political parties and thus Amendment 7
improved the overall equality, between old and large political parties
versus new and small political parties, when compared to
Amendment 6 that was struck down.
But one can reach this conclusion only if one is very formalistic.
Substantively, this constitutional dialogue between the Knesset and
the Court was deficient in three ways: First, the Knesset did not even
await the Court's reasoning of why it found the statute violating equal
elections norm. This shows lack of minimal respect to the Court. It
was the Knesset's duty at the very minimum to hear the Court's
reasoning and consider it before deciding on its actions."' In fact, MK
146. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 4 (Landau, President).
147. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 30.
148. DK (1981) 2903 (Isr.).
149. Id. The statute passed first reading twice. On June 3, 1981, sixty MKs supported
the Act and six were against. Id. at 2907. Because the support was less than sixty-one
MKs, the Knesset voted again on June 15, 1981, with seventy-three MKs supporting the
Act and ten against (first reading), sixty-five for and one against (second reading), and
sixty-four in favor and one against (third reading). DK (1981) 2938, 2945 (Isr.).
150. Elections Law (Propaganda Ways) (Amendment No. 7), 5741-1981, SH No. 1031
p. 331 (Isr.). Draft Bill Elections (Propaganda Ways) (Amendment No. 7), 1981 HH 443
(Isr.).
151. The Knesset has probably done so because of the looming elections, which took
place on June 30, 1981. However, this should have been no excuse for the Knesset to act
accordingly. It could have left the current propaganda law intact and amended it only with
regard to later elections.
Mordechai Virshuvsky protested in the Knesset that this enactment
passed too quickly with no adequate consideration. "We don't even
know why the Israeli Supreme Court, in quite a historical decision,
with a majority of five Justices [the entire panel], in a special [wide]
panel, decided to invalidate the statute of the Knesset."'52 He also
stated that it was not even clear whether Amendment 7, about to be
enacted, continues the violation of equal elections norm or not.'53 MK
Gideon Hausner argued that with this enactment the Knesset was
actually sending the Court a message: "We don't care, whatever you
decide on the merit of the case, your opinion is of no concern to the
Knesset."" MK Shulamit Aloni argued that this amendment was
"overruling" the Court and provides no real protection for the
minority from majority abuse.5  It is interesting to note that the
Israeli Supreme Court in the Velner decision, dealing with the
Knesset's attempts to protect the religious status quo from change
brought about via judicial decisions, ruled that it was the Knesset's
duty to listen to the Court's reasoning and consider it on the merits,
not preempt it by a general override that insulates the status quo from
judicial change.'
Second, the Knesset gave retroactive revalidation to the change
in election laws. This overrules the Court's decision and represents
an undue interference in the effect of the Court's decision with regard
to the past.
Third, the content of the statute does not truly obviate the
problem of inequality in elections. As the Court explained in its
reasoning, published after Amendment 7 was enacted, the main
problem with Amendment 6 was not the two minutes reduction in the
general propaganda time granted to all parties but the great gap
between the times allotted existing and large parties versus new and
small political parties.' This gap was largely retained under
Amendment 7. In fact, Justice Beiski explicitly stated that the main
difficulty with Amendment 6 was the increase in the individual
152. DK (1981) 2902 (Isr.).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2903.
155. Id. at 2902-03.
156. HCJ 5364/94 Velner v. Chair of Labor Party 49(1) PD 758, 790-92 [1995] (Isr.)
(Barak, Deputy President).
157. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 15 (Barak, J.), 27 (Beiski, J.), 29 (Ben
Porat, J.).
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propaganda time, not the change in the general propaganda time.'
This increase was retained under Amendment 7.
Agudat Derech Eretz provides additional support that the power
of judicial review during the founding era was very weak and
formalistic. It was largely overruled and ignored by the Knesset.
3. The Laor Movement Decision in 1990
Another example of the Knesset's end run around the Court's
authority is found in the Laor Movement decision."9 In that case, the
statute at issue infringed upon the principle of equal elections in
violation of Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.'" Two weeks after
the elections for the twelfth Knesset-the same Knesset that enacted
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation-the Knesset's finance committee decided, and later
ratified by statute, to retroactively increase the public funding granted
to the political parties that had competed in the previous election.
This was done to cover huge deficits that the parties suffered as a
result of the preceding electoral campaign.
Prima facie, the increase did not infringe upon the principle of
equal elections, since all elected political parties would have enjoyed
it equally. De facto, the statute, if valid, would have permitted
political parties to spend more money than their economic fortunes
allowed for campaigning if they could safely assume they would be
part of the majority in the forthcoming legislature and could then
enact a statute with retroactive funding increase. This would have
heavily distorted election results, since small parties that were
insecure about their electoral success would be unable to spend
equally with large political parties whose future place in the Knesset
was guaranteed. The retroactive funding would have meant unequal
elections in real time.
To be valid, section 4 required that this retroactive funding
statute pass with the support of a majority of MKs, i.e., sixty-one
MKs. The majority opinion in the Laor Movement decision struck
down the statute because it was not passed with the requisite majority
of MKs in all its readings. In the preliminary reading, which was
required in addition to the three regular readings since the statute
was proposed by a private MK, there was no absolute majority
158. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 27.
159. Laor Movement, supra note 92.
160. The Financing Political Parties (Amendment 8) Act, 5733-1973, SH No.1266 p. 6,
§ 2 (Isr.).
present."' Thus, the majority opinion chose the solution that aligned
with the language of sections 4 and 46 of Basic Law: The Knesset
(requiring absolute majority "in all phases of legislation") and
reached its desired result of invalidating an outrageous statute.
Deputy President Menachmen Elon, who wrote the majority opinion,
explicitly explained that between two possible interpretations of the
Basic Laws, one should prefer the interpretation that grants better
protection to the norm of equal elections from gross infringements.162
But Justice Barak dissented, finding the repugnant statute valid. He
interpreted sections 4 and 46 to mean that no absolute majority was
required in a preliminary reading, as opposed to the three regular
readings. 6 1
The Knesset approved of Barak's dissent, since it meant that it
did not need an absolute majority in preliminary readings. We can
say ironically that the easier it became to violate equal elections
norms, the better-from the Knesset's perspective.'64 A month after
the Laor Movement decision, the Knesset amended, within a single
day, with the support of at least sixty-one MKs, section 46 of Basic
Law: The Knesset to read explicitly that majorities were necessary
only in the "three readings" rather than in "all phases of
legislation."6 6 The Knesset further provided that this amendment
would apply retroactively from August 6, 1959-that is, stretching
161. Laor Movement, supra note 92, at 554-74 (Elon, Deputy President, and Maltz, J.)
(decided on July 1, 1990).
162. Laor Movement, supra note 92, at 568.
163. Laor Movement, supra note 92, at 544-51. Justice Barak may have chosen this
position strategically. The majority opinion struck down the outrageous statute and thus
his decision did not affect the result of the case. Instead, he wrote an extremely important
obiter in this decision. The obiter dealt with the question of whether the statute may be
invalidated for violating not Basic Law: The Knesset but equality as a defining
fundamental value of the legal system. Barak held in obiter that jurisprudentially the
court may be justified in striking down statutes, even without a formal constitution, if they
are grossly repugnant to the most fundamental values of the legal system. He suggested,
however, that the Court in Israel should not act upon such power yet as it would be against
the current prevailing social consensus as to the scope of the Court's power. With this
obiter, Barak laid the grounds for common-law constitutionalism discussed below.
164. Some MKs offered a different explanation for this action. They suggested that
they wanted to strengthen individual MKs' ability to propose private statutes rather than
concentrating this power in the government alone. DK (1990) 4973 (Isr.) (Amnon
Rubinstein, MK).
165. Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment 11), 5750-1990, SH No.1329 p. 196 (Isr.).
The vote on the statute was composed as follows: Ninety for, sixteen against, one
abstaining (first reading) (DK (1990) 4980 (Isr.)); eighty-two for, five against, no
abstaining (second reading); seventy-six for, thirteen against, no abstaining (third reading)
(DK (1990) 5006 (Isr.)).
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back retroactivity for roughly thirty years.'" It also explicitly stated
that any past statute that amended section 4 without an absolute
majority during the preliminary reading was nonetheless valid from
the time of its enactment, yet again using a semi-notwithstanding
language ("to remove any doubt"). Furthermore, the Knesset did not
even identify the statutes that may benefit from this retroactive
revalidation, using a general reference language that any statute
167would enjoy this protection. This enactment annulled the Laor
Movement majority opinion retroactively, thus, running against basic
principles of separation of powers. In fact, during the Knesset's
discussions, MKs made clear that they intended this amendment to
apply to the finance statute that was struck down in the Laor
Movement decision.'" MK Mordechai Virshuvsky contended that
"this was a retroactive amendment to something that was already
retroactive." 69 An appeal to the High Court against this enactment
was rejected in the Blum decision. A day after Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty was enacted, Justice Barak wrote that this
retroactive revalidation technique was valid, and he found no
difficulty in retroactive amendment of Basic Laws.o
We may conclude that, in three out of four cases-Bergman,
Derech Eretz and Laor Movement-the Knesset circumvented the
Court's exercise of judicial review by using retroactive revalidation of
infringing statutes. In two out of the three mentioned, Bergman and
Laor Movement, the Knesset further revalidated the statutes by way
of reference, using a semi-notwithstanding language that prevented
the success of later challenges to their constitutionality.17' MKs were
aware of the similarity between their reactions to the Bergman and
Laor Movement decisions, some viewing both as "revalidation laws"
or even statutes "to circumvent the High Court."'72
166. Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment 11), 5750-1990, SH No.1329 p. 196, § 2
(Isr.).
167. Id. at § 3.
168. DK (1990) 4972 (Isr.).
169. Id. at 4974.
170. See HCJ 410/91 Blum v. Chairman of the Knesset 46(2) PD 201 [1992] (Isr.)
[hereinafter Blum] (affirming the validity of Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment 11),
5750-1990, SH No.1329 p. 196 (Isr.)).
171. Only in the Rubinstein case did the Knesset abide by the substantive judgment of
the Court and did not circumvent it retroactively. See Dor, supra note 11, at 244;
Rubinstein, supra note 92.
172. DK (1990) 4972-73 (Isr.).
B. The Nature of the Constitutional Dialogue
This method of omnibus revalidation by way of reference,
present in two of the four cases discussed above, raises a
constitutional problem: Instead of forcing the legislature to consider
each infringement on constitutional provisions for its own sake and
determine the propriety, desirability, and constitutionality of that
infringing provision, the legislature only pays lip service to the status
of the Basic Law. This is not the kind of respect we demand of
legislative assemblies when it comes to constitutional provisions.' 3 It
also does not enable the legislature to self-consciously and publicly
take responsibility for infringing the Constitution. How can either
legislative members or the public assess the constitutional
ramifications and the severity of the infringement if there is no
discussion of the nature of the infringement? It is a blank check for
circumventing the Constitution.
This, in fact, has been some of the harsh criticism raised against
the famous Ford decision in Canada.' 4 In Ford, the Canadian
Supreme Court upheld the validity of an omnibus override on the
part of Quebec's legislature, which took the form of a standard
general provision inserted in all past statutes. This general override
stated that all past statutes were valid notwithstanding the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and it was done to protest the
adoption of the Charter without Quebec's consent."' Weinrib, for
example, criticized the Ford decision for enabling the Quebec
legislature such robust override of the Charter. Instead, she
suggested that the override mechanisms should have been interpreted
to demand more specificity on the part of the legislature with regard
to which rights were infringed by which statutes and whether such
infringement was justified. The degree of specificity required might
be a function of the right's importance.'
173. The duty of respect is explicitly provided for in Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, § 11: "All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this
Basic Law." Similar provision appears in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, § 5. Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994), THE KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/
specialleng/basic4_eng.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
174. See, e.g., Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, Learning to Live With the Override, 35
MCGILL L.J. 541 (1990); Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New
Canadian Version, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 90 n.114 (1984).
175. Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.) [hereinafter
Ford].
176. Weinrib, supra note 174, at 555 (leaving open the question of what degree of
specificity would be sufficient).
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The Knesset's technique consisted of not only omnibus
revalidation of infringing statutes by way of reference but also
retroactive effect to such actions. The retroactive revalidation was
present in three of the four cases discussed. The main constitutional
difficulty with granting retroactive validity to infringing statutes is the
general problem of the "rule of law," which requires that legislation
generally have only prospective application." If the legislature can
retroactively circumvent the constitution, then the constitution cannot
be deemed supreme. Indeed, the only part in Quebec's sweeping
general override of the Charter that was overruled by Ford was its
retroactive applicability."' In contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court saw
no difficulty in retroactive revalidation on the part of the Knesset.
Thus, while the prevailing scholarly understanding is that the
Knesset acquiesced to the Bergman progeny, and thereby consented
to judicial review over primary legislation, it is my contention that a
careful analysis of how the Knesset responded reveals a very different
outcome."'9 The Knesset's method of certifying infringing statutes
retroactively by way of reference actually mirrors the way the Knesset
placed even entrenched Basic Laws on par with regular statutes
during the founding era. That the Israeli Supreme Court repeatedly
validated the Knesset's technique shows that it, too, treated the Basic
Laws as part of a parliamentary sovereignty tradition during this
180era.
Moreover, even as late as March 26, 1992, Barak, too, accepted
the Knesset's retroactive validation technique, treating entrenched
Basic Laws as part of Israel's parliamentary sovereignty tradition."
Only in January 1994, when responding to the Knesset's initial draft
of amendment to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, did Barak write
in a letter to the Knesset that it is questionable whether the Knesset
as a constituent assembly is authorized to amend the constitution
177. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 51-63 (rev. ed. 1969). See also
Jeremy Waldron, Retroactive Law: How Dodgy was Duynhoven?, 10 OTAGO L. REv. 631
(2004) (criticizing retroactivity also in the context of electoral laws).
178. See Ford, supra note 175.
179. For the prevailing understanding, see supra notes 11 and 12, and accompanying
text.
180. Ressler, supra note 75. In Ressler, the Court accepted the legitimacy of the
Validity Act and thus refrained from reviewing certain provisions of an election law that
was protected under the Act.
181. See Blum, supra note 170.
retroactively." Both the Knesset's and the Court's own actions thus
support a parliamentary sovereignty model for Israel prior to United
Mizrahi Bank.
IV. How Revolutionary was United Mizrahi Bank?
We now understand the constitutional status of both the Basic
Laws and judicial review prior to United Mizrahi Bank. This will
enable us to appreciate the scope of the revolution formed with the
United Mizrahi Bank decision.
Prior to United Mizrahi Bank, the Court did not provide a
coherent theory explaining why it could enforce entrenchment
provisions on noncompliant Knessets. It did not even explain
whether it consciously treated absolute majority requirements as
entrenchment. Justice Landau, deciding in 1969 the first case that
exercised this power of judicial review over primary legislation,
explicitly declared that "the Court was not deciding the issue," due
to the urgency of deciding the case on its merits." Since the 1969
Bergman decision, the Knesset adhered to the Court's ruling probably
because it too felt the need to respect equal elections norms and not
infringe upon them without the required support of an absolute
majority of MKs. Thus, prior to the United Mizrahi Bank decision in
1995, there was no real judicial or legislative discussion of the Court's
scope of judicial review authority over primary legislation.
United Mizrahi Bank changed everything. The Court utilized the
first case challenging the constitutionality of a statute as incompatible
with the 1992 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom to declare a
"constitutional revolution" brought about by the 1992 enactment.
This was done, as discussed above, despite the fact that the enactment
of the 1992 Basic Laws did not amount to a special process
characteristic of constitutional rather than regular politics. Neither
did the substantive entrenchment provisions of the 1992 Basic Laws
182. Barak, Amendments, supra note 105, at 549. The Knesset has accepted Barak's
recommendations on how to draft the amendment, including his advice on the distinction
between infringement and amendment of the Basic Law.
183. Bergman, supra note 10, at 696 (translated in 4 ISR. L. REv. 560 as "[w]e have
decided not to do so because for obvious reasons the material problems facing us in these
hearings call for [a] speedy solution and consideration of the preliminary constitutional
questions would necessitate a lengthy hearing on its own. We shall therefore leave the
matter of justiciability as requiring further consideration. Obviously nothing that we shall
say here is intended to express any view on this point.").
184. For Justice Landau's view of his Bergman decision, and his critique of its use in
United Mizrahi Bank, see supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
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necessitate such a revolution, as they appear also in regular statutes in
countries that lack a formal constitution.' The decision is thus
exemplary of the Israeli Court's extraordinary role in the formation
of a constitution.
The Court, in an eight to one decision, clarified that it viewed the
Basic Laws as Israel's formal Constitution and that, as a result, it had
the power of judicial review over primary legislation." The decision
further introduced the distinction between constitutional amendment,
on the one hand, and infringement by regular statute, on the other,
into Israel's jurisprudence. It decided that in the future the Knesset
may amend a Basic Law only by means of a Basic Law, and not by
mere enactment. That is, the statute amending the Basic Law must
be accompanied by the word "Basic" in its title. It also determined
that any regular law infringing upon a Basic Law must satisfy the
Basic Laws' requirements with regard to infringement to be valid.
Before this decision, no one knew Israel had a constitution. The
United Mizrahi Bank decision clarified that Israel has one, at least
according to the Court. If, in the past, Basic Laws that were not
procedurally entrenched were treated as regular laws, a Basic Law
was now required to amend them. 7 If substantive entrenchment in a
regular law was previously interpreted as requiring mere explicit
repeal, now substantive entrenchment in a Basic Law would
supposedly require the Knesset to abide by the substantive
requirements." In fact, since United Mizrahi Bank, the Knesset has
largely accepted the Court's judicial review "trumping" power as
manifested time and again in its willingness to either amend regular
statutes found by the Court to be unconstitutional,"s' or to let statutes
185. See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS 202-03 (2010) (recognizing that New Zealand has a statutory Bill of
Rights with a limitations clause but its status is that of regular law).
186. If one could have argued that United Mizrahi Bank left it vague whether all Basic
Laws or just the 1992 Basic Laws enjoy the status of supreme law, later cases clarified that
the United Mizrahi Bank holding pertained to all Basic Laws and that they are all treated
as supreme. See, e.g., HCJ 212/03 Herut-The Nat'l Movement v. Chairman of the
Elections Cent.Comm'n to the Sixteenth Knesset 57(1) PD 750 [2003] (Isr.); EA 92/03
Mofaz v. Chairman of the Elections Cent. Comm'n to the Sixteenth Knesset 57(3) PD 793
[2003] (Isr.).
187. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, 406-07 (Barak, President).
188. But see Justice Cheshin's dissenting views discussed infra Part V.
189. Since United Mizrahi Bank, the Court found (by at least a majority) that eight
statutes or provisions thereof were unconstitutional. These cases include: HCJ 1715/97
Lishkat Menahalei HaHashkaot in Isr. v. Minister of Treasury 51(4) PD 367 [1997] (Isr.)
(ruling unconstitutional the regulation of brokers practicing in the field for a substantial
time); HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Def. 53(5) PD 241 [1999] (Isr.) (ruling
lapse into desuetude. Furthermore, when the Knesset has chosen to
amend statutes, it has overwhelmingly complied with the Court's
specific instructions as to how to amend the statutes to be
constitutional." No longer did the Knesset revalidate statutes
retroactively, by way of reference, as was done until United Mizrahi
Bank. If, before, judicial review over primary legislation manifested
itself only with regard to section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset and
more specifically the norm of equal elections, now the power would
extend to other constitutional issues, primarily individual rights. The
unconstitutional the detention of soldiers to up to ninety-six hours without appearance
before a magistrate); HCJ 1030/99 MK Oron v. Chairman of Knesset 56(3) PD 640 [2002]
(Isr.) (finding the law legalizing existing pirate radio stations unconstitutional); HCJ
1661/05 Hamoeza Haezurit Hof Aza v. Israeli Knesset 59(2) PD 481 [2005] (Isr.) (finding
the compensation provisions for evacuation of Gaza settlements unconstitutional); HCJ
8276/05 Adalah v. Minister of Def. (Dec. 12, 2006) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
(Isr.) (finding a provision in a statute exempting the State from tort liability for acts done
in hostility areas, that are not war acts, unconstitutional); HCJ 2605/05 Human Rights
Dep't v. Minister of Fin. (Nov. 19, 2009) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.)
(invalidating privatization of prisons); CrimA 8823/07 John Doe v. Israel (Feb. 11, 2010)
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (invalidating a section in a provisional
statute applicable to suspects in security offenses because of due process concerns); HCJ
4124/00 Yekutieli v. Minister of Religious Affairs (June 14, 2010) Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription) (Isr.) (invalidating part of a budget statute but only prospectively with
regard to the next budget year).
It should also be noted that it has been debated how to interpret HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v.
Minister of Interior Affairs 61(2) PD 202 [2006] (Isr.) (dealing with the constitutionality of
a provisional statute severely restricting entrance to Israel of people from belligerent
areas). According to the result of the case, a majority left the statute intact. According to
the reasoning, there may have been a majority in favor of striking the statute down.
190. In three of the eight cases in which there was a majority opinion invalidating a
statute or part thereof-Lishkat Menahalei Haskaot, Tzemach, and John Doe-the
Knesset responded within a few months by amending the legislation in line with the
Court's instructions on how to remedy their unconstitutionality. See Regulating the
Practice of Advising on Investment and Managing Investment Profiles (Amendment 4),
1998, S.H. 250; Military Judging Act (Amendment 36), 5760-2000, S.H. No. 1734 p. 152
[Isr.]; Criminal Procedure Act (Detainee Suspected of Security Offense) (Provisional Act)
(Amendment 2), 5771-2010, S.H. No. 2269 p. 118 [Isr.]. The MK Oron and Human Rights
Department decisions terminated Channel 7 Radio Broadcast and the intended opening of
a private prison respectively. The Adalah case is respected so that the State does not
enjoy immunity from suits for tort acts that are not "war acts." See, e.g., CA 1864/09
Estate of Ahmed Sacafi v. Israel (Sept. 7, 2011) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription)
(Isr.). The government has implemented the Hamoeza Haezurit HofAza decision through
a special administrative body, Tnufa, that dealt solely with the difficulties of those
evacuated from their houses. See PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, http://sela.pmo.gov.il/PMO/
Hitnatkut/HomePage.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2011). Only with regard to the Yekutieli
decision is there a petition against the constitutionality of the Knesset's enactment in
reaction to the Court's decision. HCJ 616/11 Israeli Students Union v. Israel (undecided),
see Documents, NEWS1, http://www.newsl.co.il/uploadFiles/580074489116669.doc&usg=Alk
JrhglWLb3AcKlyVXxAPJX_7kRfKg2A (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
500 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:2
Winter 2012] PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY & JUDICIAL REVIEW 501
United Mizrahi Bank Court created a dual-tier of enactments where
none existed before. If this is not a revolution, what is?
V. Legitimizing United Mizrahi Bank
In United Mizrahi Bank, the Justices offered three different
theories to explain their judicial review power over primary
legislation. Eight of the nine Justices sitting in the case held that such
power is only possible in the context of a formal constitution. This
position stands in sharp contrast to the Court's practice during the
founding era, as discussed above. The Justices ruled Israel has a
formal constitution, in the form of the Basic Laws. Only Justice
Cheshin dissented, holding that such judicial review power can exist
without a formal constitution. He believed Israel lacked a formal
constitution because the People never consented to adopting one.
Nonetheless, Cheshin treated the Basic Laws as setting "manner and
form" requirements that the Knesset must fulfill. If it did not, the
Court was authorized to so hold. Even substantive entrenchment
provisions may be translated to "manner and form" requirements by
providing the Knesset the choice either to comply with them
substantively or explicitly override them procedurally. Procedural
entrenchment, on the other hand, to comply with majority rule, will
be read as requiring no more than an absolute majority support to
amend statutes.' 9' Cheshin's dissenting opinion thus remained faithful
to Israel's parliamentary sovereignty tradition.
Within the majority opinion, a dispute arose between retiring
President Shamgar and the incoming President Barak regarding the
constitutional theory that justifies both recognizing the Basic Laws as
Israel's Constitution and deriving from it their power of judicial
review."' Shamgar held that the Knesset created a supreme
constitution through its power of self-entrenchment. He recognized
the Knesset's power to bind itself both procedurally and
substantively. The products of entrenchment were the Basic Laws
which should be treated as Israel's Constitution. Shamgar thus
adopted Hart's theory that it is possible to conceive of a sovereign
191. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 529-64 (Cheshin, J.).
192. The Courts (Consolidated Version) Act, 5744-1984, SH No. 1123 p. 198, § 15 (Isr.)
allows each retiring judge, within three months of her retirement, to write opinions in
cases that she heard while sitting on the bench. United Mizrahi Bank was decided during
Shamgar's first three months of retirement.
Three other Justices joined Barak's theory to create a plurality opinion while three others
remained undecided which of the two theories-Barak's or Shamgar's-was preferable.
legislature capable of restricting its sovereignty.193 He recognized a
weak-form constitution based on a sovereign parliament's power to
entrench some of its enactments. This constitution would do its job of
protecting fundamental values, as long as successor parliaments
would abide by the entrenching provisions. When they do not, it will
be up to the Court to decide whether to coerce them to abide by the
entrenchment. So far, in contrast to the experience in other parts of
the common-law world, 94 the Israeli Court does in fact coerce
Parliament to abide by the entrenchment, thus establishing de facto a
constitutional regime. It is a very shaky regime, since most of the
Basic Laws are not even entrenched and may be easily amended by a
mere random majority of MKs, as long as they title the enactment
"Basic Law." Those Basic Laws that are entrenched usually require a
majority of sixty-one MKs to be amended, and the governmental
coalition usually controls a majority of MKs. 95
Barak, in contrast, held that the Knesset enjoyed dual powers of
both a legislative and a constituent assembly. Only in its capacity as a
constituent assembly was the Knesset authorized to adopt a
constitution (in the form of Basic Laws) that binds the Knesset in its
capacity as a regular legislative assembly. He doubted whether the
Knesset in its capacity as a regular legislative, as distinguished from
constituent, chamber was authorized to entrench its enactments due
to democratic concerns.'96 While Barak's dualist theory is attractive
and resembles the American popular sovereignty theory," it may be
construed by some as somewhat artificial in light of Israel's
parliamentary sovereignty history, as discussed above. It, too, is
193. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 283-94 (Shamgar, President); HART, supra
note 21, at 149.
194. See discussion in supra note 103. Even Hart, on whose writings Shamgar relies
when discussing the two concepts of sovereignty, openly admits that the concept of a self-
restricting sovereign has been rejected de facto. HART, supra note 102.
195. Since Israel has a parliamentary system and its electoral system is based on
proportional representation, the government, which enjoys the support of a majority of
the Knesset, usually consists of many coalition partners with different constitutional
agendas and it would require their consent to constitutional change. Since the
constitutional revolution, some political parties have even included in their coalition
agreements that no amendment of the Basic Laws would be done without their consent.
Thus, it may prove a challenge, after all, for the government to master the necessary
absolute majority.
196. Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 355-91 (Barak, President).
197. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 160-229 (1992); ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 16; ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 16; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending
the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
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ultimately weak and is subject to the Knesset's power to amend the
Basic Laws by simple or absolute majorities according to the Basic
Laws' provisions.
With an awareness of the inherent weak form of
constitutionalism they establish against a parliamentary sovereignty
tradition, all Justices in United Mizrahi Bank were careful to couple
their theory with implicit references to commitment to foundational
constitutional values of Israel's constitutional system. They left for
future court decisions to define these foundational values. Thus,
Shamgar wrote of inherent limits to entrenchment power and hinted
at Israel's foundational values as Jewish and democratic, Barak wrote
of the "unconstitutional constitutional amendment" or abuse of
constituent power, and Cheshin spoke of democracy as a foundational
value.9  In this way, the Court guaranteed that, although the
legislature may easily amend the Basic Laws, it did so in the shadow
of foundationalism, knowing that not every amendment to the Basic
Laws will be treated by the Court as constitutional. If it
fundamentally violates Israel's core foundational values, the Court
may find it either unconstitutional or against foundationalist
common-law constitutional values. Traces of such foundationalist
theory are latent in the United States,'" but explicit in Germany
("unconstitutional constitutional amendment");200 India ("essential
constitutional features");20' and the United Kingdom ("common-law
constitutionalism").202 In fact, since United Mizrahi Bank, the
political branches have largely refrained from amending the 1992
Basic Laws dealing with individual rights. Such respect, however, is
not granted to the Basic Laws dealing with the structure of
government, which are still subject to frequent amendment.
Although omitted from the international literature on
commonwealth constitutionalism, as mentioned above, Israel, like
198. Mizrahi Bank, supra note 3, at 293 (Shamgar, President), 406-08 (Barak,
President), 522-64 (Cheshin, J.).
199. Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once
and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 163-90 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). Cf ACKERMAN,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 16, at 3-33.
200. Articles 1, 20 & 79(3) of the German Basic Law; DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 48, 542
(2d ed. 1997).
201. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India); Gary
Jeffrey Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative Perspective, 4 INT'L
J. CONST. L. 460 (2006).
202. For supporters of common-law constitutionalism, see supra note 118.
Commonwealth countries (notably Canada, the United Kingdom and
New Zealand), has thus succeeded in creating a middle ground
between the sovereignty of the legislature and the supremacy of the
Constitution (or, some would say, of the Justices).203 After United
Mizrahi Bank, Israel enjoys a formal supreme constitution in the
form of the Basic Laws that are protected via judicial review. This
Constitution, however, is vulnerable to the light entrenchment
requirements provided for in the Basic Laws. While it is too early to
make a final judgment, it seems that the political branches so far
largely respect this constitutional transformation in their willingness
to abide by Court's decisions to invalidate statutes.24 This
cooperation stands in sharp contrast to the behavior of those
branches during Israel's founding era, when they paid merely lip-
service to the meaning of judicial review and constitutionalism, as
discussed above.
VI. Lessons for Comparative Constitutional Law
A. Aligning Parliamentary Sovereignty with Constitutionalism
We have seen that Israel's constitutional system prior to United
Mizrahi Bank functioned under parliamentary sovereignty. It lacked
a formal constitution, treating constitutional and regular law alike.
Nonetheless, it enabled the exercise of American style judicial review
under which a court could decide not to apply a statute. It is thus a
case that shatters the conventional axiom that judicial review over
primary legislation is exercised only, or mainly, to protect a formal
constitution. It further rejects the aphorism that no judicial review of
primary legislation is possible within a true parliamentary sovereignty
tradition, Dicey notwithstanding.
What methods are available to introduce judicial review within a
parliamentary sovereignty tradition? Israel's experience suggests a
number of alternative mechanisms. One option is the use of "soft"
procedural entrenchment-that is, not exceeding the requirement of
an absolute majority support of members of parliament to amend a
statute. If this requirement is not respected by the legislature, the
court could coerce the legislature to abide by its own self-imposed
203. For a comprehensive treatment of Israel's post-United Mizrahi Bank
constitutional dilemmas, see Rivka Weill, The Israeli Case for Judicial Review and Why
We Should Care, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1739625.
204. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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soft entrenchment. Because the procedural entrenchment does not
exceed the absolute majority requirement, it aligns with legislative
majority rule and is thus democratic.
Another mechanism is the use of ultra-vires-the legislature's
usurpation of power doctrine when conflicts of interest arise, such as
the legislature's decision to entrench itself in office. The legislature,
as the people's representative, does not enjoy more power than
granted to it at election. This doctrine has strong roots in
parliamentary sovereignty tradition tracing back to Dr. Bonham's
Case of the seventeenth century.205
A third mechanism is quorum or "manner and form"
requirements, which enable the court to declare that certain statutes
are simply not law because they were not enacted in accordance with
the appropriate predetermined legislative procedure. If "manner and
form" requirements do not exceed absolute majority requirements,
they, too, conform to majority rule.20
Last, but not least, is the use of judicial review to protect core
democratic values in accordance with Ely's theory. Under this
approach, the use of judicial review would not be perceived as
counter-majoritarian. All these methods represent a "soft" form of
constitutionalism that conforms to parliamentary sovereignty.
These mechanisms of soft-form constitutionalism, which may
align with parliamentary sovereignty, can assist the constitutional
system to evolve over time into stronger forms of constitutionalism,
as evident in Israel's second phase of constitutionalism. In fact, two
of the three theories of constitutionalism offered in United Mizrahi
Bank-"manner and form" and legislative self-entrenchment-are
still based on parliamentary sovereignty traditions. Even
foundationalist commitments, if they are to democracy itself, have
their historical roots in parliamentary sovereignty systems.
Israel's experience thus suggests that formal constitutions may be
adopted, both empirically and normatively, in an evolutionary fashion
without "constitutional moments." It also shows that unelected
bodies, such as a Supreme Court, may lead or play a dominant role in
bringing about constitutional change. It ultimately demonstrates that,
although the concepts of parliamentary sovereignty and governance
by formal constitution are considered polar opposites, the two may
interrelate.
205. See sources on Dr. Bonham's Case cited supra note 116.
206. On the difference between "manner and form" and entrenchment, see supra Part
II.
B. Theoretical Roots of Override Power
Israel's constitutional experience also sheds light on the
theoretical roots of the "notwithstanding" power. How did the Israeli
legislature come to possess this override power when no express
"notwithstanding" clause existed in the Basic Laws during Israel's
founding era? In fact, the "notwithstanding" clause is considered a
Canadian invention to bridge parliamentary sovereignty in the British
style with the supremacy of the Constitution in the American style. It
represents a compromise struck between the federal Prime Minister
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who desired American constitutionalism, and
the heads of the Provinces, who wanted to protect their sovereign
powers. The compromise granted the courts judicial review power to
invalidate statutes, but allowed the legislatures to overcome these
judgments by exercising the "notwithstanding" doctrine. That is, the
legislatures may reenact the infringing statute using explicit override
language or they may even use this power preemptively, before a
court has ruled on the constitutionality of the statute.207 Thus, the
legislatures are forced to debate and ultimately pay a political price
for infringing rights. The Israeli experience with override language
predates the 1982 Canadian Charter, however.
It is less known that the "notwithstanding" clause was not
invented in 1982 with the adoption of the Charter,20' but rather first
appeared in the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960.20 Furthermore, the
two documents-Charter and Canadian Bill of Rights-differ
substantially. The Canadian Bill of Rights was enacted as regular
federal legislation subject to simple majority change, while the
Charter was enacted through a special dualist process that gained
federal consent along with all of the Provinces, except Quebec. 21 0 The
Charter may be amended only through special majorities.' Thus, in
the 1960 context, the "notwithstanding" provision enhanced the
207. Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 721-22; Stephanopoulos, supra note 11.
208. Tsvi Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, 52 U. TORONTO
L.J. 221, 226 n.22 (2002) (discussing controversies surrounding the origins of the
notwithstanding clause but failing to mention that it first appeared in the Canadian Bill of
Rights of 1960).
209. Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 S.C., ch. 44, § 2 (Can.). See also 2 HOGG, supra note
19, at 173; Hiebert, supra note 17, at 13; Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 719-21. Paul Weiler
who, according to his testimony, fathered the notwithstanding clause in the Charter did
ascribe its origins to the Bill of Rights of 1960. See Weiler, supra note 174, at 80 n.97.
210. 2 HOGG, supra note 19, at 15-16, 28-29.
211. Section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act,
1982, Ch. 11 (U.K.).
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stature of the Bill of Rights, which would otherwise be equal to any
regular statute.212 In the 1982 context, the notwithstanding clause
lessened the status of the Charter, which is otherwise supreme.213 The
Israeli experience, with the override during its founding era, fits more
naturally with the mechanism of the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960
than with that of the Charter, since the override operated against a
background of parliamentary sovereignty. But it is unlikely that the
Israeli legislature was aware of this Canadian clause when using its
override.
My suggestion is that the Israeli experience with the
"notwithstanding" practice should also be divided into two periods:
Before and after the enactment of the 1992 Basic Laws dealing with
individual rights. In the first period, there was no formal
"notwithstanding" clause in the Basic Laws. There was also no
Canadian influence. Nonetheless, the Israeli Court, within a
parliamentary sovereignty tradition, enabled the legislature to either
abide by or amend an entrenched provision in Basic Law: The
Knesset. In response, the legislature often overrode the provision
instead of amending it, an option that the Court had not explicitly
made available to it. The legislature thus perceived the override as a
substitute for amendment. This was possible because the override
power was not limited in time like its Canadian Charter counterpart,
which established a sunset provision of five years for the effectiveness
of the override unless the legislature actively renews it.2 14 Instead of
amending the Basic Law, the Israeli legislature thus clarified that, in a
conflict between the infringing statute and the entrenched Basic Law,
the former should prevail. The override was a tool of statutory
interpretation to overcome a presumption against implied repeal of
fundamental rights within a parliamentary sovereignty tradition. This
is also why the override was repeatedly used by the Israeli legislature
and accepted as valid by the courts.
212. The Canadian Bill of Rights was initially effective only as an interpretive
constitution. The courts, under its guidance, attempted to interpret statutes in a way that
respected the rights protected by the Bill. Eventually, ten years after its adoption, the
Canadian Supreme Court interpreted the Canadian Bill of Rights as authorizing judicial
review to invalidate statutes that could not be interpreted as aligning with the Bill and
there was no explicit override language in them. R. v. Drybones, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 282
(Can.). Nonetheless, there is general agreement that even after this momentous decision,
the Canadian Bill of Rights failed to successfully protect rights. This in turn led to the
adoption of the Charter in 1982. See Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 719-21.
213. 2 HOGG, supra note 19, at 22-23; Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 722. Cf Heibert,
supra note 17, at 13.
214. Section 33 of the Charter.
In fact, Justice Shamgar in Agudat Derech Eretz explicitly stated
his opinion that the entrenchment provision of section 4 of Basic Law:
The Knesset was intended to require that every infringement of
equality norm be done "self-consciously and explicitly." 215 "This way
we will preserve constitutional clarity, which is important, inter alia,
also because it has an educational element towards the general public.
It is important that every citizen will know, that an infringement of
equality norm took place, and what was the purpose for which it was
done." 216 The Justices expressed similar ideas in the Rubinstein217 and
Laor Movement28 decisions.
Thus, the "notwithstanding" mechanism has strong roots in
parliamentary sovereignty traditions and is a form of explicit repeal
requirement. No wonder similarities may be found in two countries
that have been greatly influenced by the British tradition-Canada
and Israel.219 This may also explain why the Canadian Supreme Court
in Ford interpreted the notwithstanding clause as setting merely
formal requirements.220 It may further explain why in both Canada
and Israel the legislatures may enact an override clause with regular
or absolute majorities respectively. As long as the majority required
does not exceed an absolute majority, it is still compatible with the
"manner and form" theory in general and parliamentary sovereignty
traditions in particular.22 1
215. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 23.
216. Agudat Derech Eretz, supra note 92, at 23.
217. Rubinstein, supra note 92, at 158 (Shamgar, Deputy President).
218. Laor Movement, supra note 92, at 557, 571 (Elon, Deputy President).
219. 2 HOGG, supra note 19, at 22-23 (interpreting the override clause in the Canadian
Bill of Rights as a "manner and form" device); Weiler, supra note 174, at 80 n.97 (treating
the override clause in the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights as a manner and form device). Cf
Tse, supra note 128 (arguing that the override clause in the Canadian Bill of Rights cannot
be explained as a "manner and form" device because in 1960, "manner and form"
restrictions could have been imposed on Canada only from above, via the British
Parliament). Tse thus contends that no judicial review should have been allowed under
the Canadian Bill of Rights. Tse's argument is unpersuasive since it is based on the desire
to protect parliamentary sovereignty, but under Tse's analysis, the Canadian legislature
was not sovereign in any case during that period.
220. Ford, supra note 175, para 33 ("Section 33 lays down requirements of form
only. . . ."). Canadian scholars criticized the Court for this formalistic interpretation of the
override power. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 174.
221. Another explanation may be that the more arduous the override procedure
becomes, the more incentive there is for the legislatures to amend the Constitution rather
than override it for a limited period. This is so, since the override process becomes closer
to a constitutional amendment process. We may, however, prefer that the legislatures
resort to the override, in the hope that the override will eventually lapse and protection of
rights be strengthened. Cf Stephanopoulos, supra note 11 (arguing in favor of requiring
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In contrast, after 1992, only Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation
explicitly incorporated a "notwithstanding" clause with a sunset
provision, maintaining the override's validity for only four years.222
Furthermore, it was drafted following the Canadian Charter, which
suggests that Canada served as an example to Israel's development
and national maturation.23 This override power was utilized only to
protect from judicial invalidation the prohibition against importation
of non-Kosher meat to Israel discussed above.224 Ultimately, Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation was amended to permanently exempt
the prohibition, removing the need to override the Basic Law every
four years.225 Other Basic Laws do not have formal "notwithstanding"
clauses, but we may read them into the Basic Laws if we accept
Cheshin's theory of "manner and form." Under Cheshin's theory,
Parliament must either abide by substantive entrenchment
requirements, or it must explicitly override them. This way, every
limitations clause is potentially translated into override clauses.
Substantive entrenchment is possible under Cheshin's theory, despite
his commitment to "manner and form," because in the last resort
even substantive entrenchment allows the legislature to explicitly
override it.
It is difficult to ascertain from the dormancy of the override tool
in Israel whether a political culture has developed that delegitimizes
its use, as seems to be true in Canada.22 6 It may be that the override
legislative supermajority as prerequisite for the use of the override); Weiler, supra note
174, at 90-91 n.116 (preferring that the override clause would have to be invoked twice,
before and after elections, before it becomes effective).
222. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754, SH No. 1454 p. 90, § 8 (Isr.). Basic
Law: The Knesset provides for holding elections every four years. Thus, the legislature
that might renew the override will be different from the one that previously enacted it.
Potentially, it can enable elections to discuss or even focus on intended use of the override
power. So far, this has not occurred.
223. 3 AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 634 (1994).
224. See HCJ 4676/94 Meatrael Ltd. v. Israel's Knesset 50(5) PD 15 [1996] (Isr.).
225. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, § 8(b). In my opinion, this amendment was
necessary not only to lift the Knesset's burden to override the Basic Law every few years
due to the sunset mechanism of the override clause, but because repeated override
amounts to de facto amendment and should be done accordingly.
226. In Canada, the override clause largely fell into desuetude because of Quebec's
abuse of it in the Ford case. This caused widespread resentment against the override
power in the other provinces and on the federal level. Peter W. Hogg & Allison A.
Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of
Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 83 (1997) ("In
practice, section 33 has become relatively unimportant, because of the development of a
has been marginalized because de facto Cheshin's theory has been
misunderstood or rejected by the political branches. His theory was
definitely a minority opinion on the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, if
the override ever gains general applicability in Israel, its roots should
be attributed to "manner and form" theories of interpretation. I
conclude that the override power is not a Canadian invention per se,
nor is it merely a tool that offers an intermediate ground between two
extremes: Parliamentary sovereignty on the one hand and a supreme
constitution on the other. Rather it is an institution deeply rooted in
the common-law world in general and parliamentary sovereignty
systems in particular. This should serve as a cautionary note for those
who would support the adoption of the override in systems foreign to
parliamentary sovereignty traditions, such as the United States.227
C. The Institutional Dialogue and Override Power
Finally, Israel's experience suggests that the way the parliament
reacts to a Court's ruling is no less important than the mechanism
chosen to exercise judicial review. In constitutional law, history and
political facts cannot be divorced from theory but must be analyzed in
tandem. Prior to United Mizrahi Bank, while the Court remained
laconic in its reasoning about why it enjoyed the power of judicial
review-to the point of even disguising it as "nothing was decided"-
the legislature cooperated with equal trivialization of the matter. The
legislature formally abided to the Court's decisions, yet substantively
circumvented judicial review by retroactively revalidating statutes
previously ruled unconstitutional using its override power. This is
why, despite the use of American-style judicial review, Israel
maintained a fully fledged parliamentary sovereignty system during
its founding era.
In contrast, post-United Mizrahi Bank, the Knesset no longer
circumvents the Court's judicial review power. Instead, the Knesset
either fulfills the Court's substantive instructions on how to amend
political climate of resistance to its use."); Hiebert, supra note 17, at 11; Gardbaum, supra
note 17.
227. For American scholarship apparent admiration of the override, see, for example,
Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (2003); TUSHNET, supra note 17; Stephanopoulos, supra note
11. Weiler also wrote that a congressional override technique may be suitable for
Americans and may in fact be used more prudently in a presidential, rather than a
parliamentary, system. Weiler, supra note 174, at 84-92. On comparing American and
Canadian constitutional dialogues, see, for example, Kent Roach, Dialogue or Defiance:
Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions in Canada and the United States, 4 INT'L
J. CONST. L. 347 (2006).
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invalidated statutes to redeem their constitutionality or leaves the
Court with the final say, without attempting to revalidate statutes,
declared unconstitutional by the Court, using an override language.
Thus, although it is still early to say with certainty, it seems that post-
United Mizrahi Bank Israel is transforming from parliamentary
sovereignty to robust constitutionalism. Furthermore, this
transformation is made possible only through the cooperation of the
different branches of government. Even if United Mizrahi Bank
represents extreme activism on the part of the Justices, post-United
Mizrahi Bank dialogue may establish legitimacy for the Constitution
through the acquiescence of the political branches of government.
Time will tell.
What is also clear from Israel's experience pre- and post-United
Mizrahi Bank is that, if judicial review is to have meaning, the
"notwithstanding" mechanism cannot be interpreted to enable the
retroactive revalidation of statutes by way of reference. Nor should it
serve as a replacement for normal channels of constitutional
amendment. Rather, a "notwithstanding" mechanism must apply
only on a going-forward basis and must refer specifically to the
constitutional provisions abridged, so that the legislature openly takes
responsibility for breaching (or not conforming to) high constitutional
standards.
I conclude that, while recent literature has focused on United
Mizrahi Bank, understanding Israel's past is fascinating not only to
expose the Court's unique revolutionary role in deciding United
Mizrahi Bank, but more importantly for the lessons it offers for
comparative constitutional law.
228. See supra Parts IV & V. In contrast, both the Knesset and the administrative
branch frequently ignore the Supreme Court's decisions in the administrative area rather
than follow the ruling. See JUDITH KARP, STATE NON COMPLIANCE WITH JUDICIAL
DECISIONS REPORT, available at http://www.acri.org.il/pdflkarpl.pdf.
512 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:2
